













We study how management practices shape export performance using matched production-
trade-management data for Chinese and American firms and a randomized control trial
in India. Better managed firms are more likely to export, sell more products to more
destinations, and earn higher export revenues and profits. They export higher-quality
products at higher prices and lower quality-adjusted prices. They import a wider range
of inputs and inputs of higher quality and price, from more advanced countries. We ra-
tionalize these patterns with a heterogeneous-firm model in which effective management
improves performance by raising production efficiency and quality capacity.
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1 Introduction
Productivity, management practices and international trade activity vary dramatically across firms
and countries (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Syverson, 2011). In the literature, higher
measured Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has been associated with export success and superior
management with higher profits. However, measured TFP is subject to many potential biases and,
even if perfectly measured, still constitutes a residual “black box”, while the mechanisms through
which management operates remain largely unknown. From a policy perspective, improving firm
capabilities is important for stimulating firm performance and aggregate growth, but this requires
knowledge of the determinants of firm productivity. While it is widely believed that management
strategies play a central role, especially in emerging economies trying to move up the quality ladder
(Sutton, 2012), the scant evidence for this is primarily from case studies.
In this paper we perform what we believe is the first large-scale analysis of the role of manage-
ment practices for export performance and in the process shed light on these questions. We uncover
novel empirical facts and interpret them through the lens of a heterogeneous-firm model that dis-
ciplines the estimation approach. We study the world’s two largest export economies - China and
the United States - and find consistent empirical patterns in both countries despite their very differ-
ent income levels, institutional quality, and market frictions. In particular, we exploit unique new
data on plant-level production, plant-level management practices, and transaction-level international
trade activity for 485 Chinese firms in 1999-2008 and over 10,000 US firms in 2010.
We begin with motivating evidence from a randomized control trial (RCT) that offered manage-
ment consulting to Indian firms. In a study of 31 plants over 10 years initiated by Bloom, Eifert,
Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013), improving management practices exerted causal positive
effects on TFP, qualitative measures of output quality, selection into exporting, and total export
revenues. Motivated by these patterns, we introduce a stylized model of international trade that ra-
tionalizes the RCT results and delivers a rich set of additional predictions which we can evaluate
with the comprehensive data for China and the US.
We first establish that better managed firms have superior export performance along multiple
dimensions. Companies with more effective management are systematically more likely to engage
in exporting. Conditional on exporting, they sell more products to more destinations and earn higher
export revenues and profits. Our findings hold conditional on domestic sales, suggesting that man-
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agement is disproportionately more important for trade operations.
We then present a set of results that jointly inform the mechanisms through which manage-
ment strategies affect firm performance. On the sales side, better managed firms charge higher
export prices within narrow destination-product markets. We estimate a model-consistent indicator
of product quality, and show that better management is associated with higher output quality and
lower quality-adjusted prices. On the production side, better managed firms use more expensive,
higher-quality imported inputs and more inputs from suppliers in developed economies. They also
source a wider range of intermediate inputs from more countries of origin.
Finally, we explore the relative and differential returns to good management. Decomposing
revenue-based TFPR, we show that the management component has large explanatory power across
the full range of firm trade outcomes compared to the non-management TFPR residual. We then
unbundle overall managerial competence into practices linked to the supervision of physical capi-
tal (”monitoring”) and of human resources (”incentives”). Monitoring appears more important than
incentive provision in the US; the two sets of practices play comparable roles in China, with incen-
tives being more consequential in some respects. We find little evidence that the returns to effective
management vary across sectors or ownership types.
We propose that these empirical patterns are consistent with management competence being a
key component of total factor productivity, whereby more effective managerial practices increase
both production efficiency and quality capacity. Superior management enables firms to use more
sophisticated, higher-quality inputs and more complex assembly technologies that increase output
quality. At the same time, better management allows firms to process inputs and execute assembly
more cheaply. These efficiency and quality channels push marginal cost in opposite directions,
such that the net effect of management competence on prices and quantities is ambiguous, but it
unambiguously raises quality, sales, and profits. These predictions hold in model extensions with
endogenous input choice, endogenous management practices, or non-management TFP components.
Our main empirical analysis exploits cross-sectional variation in management and trade activ-
ity across Chinese and American firms. We therefore do not distinguish between a causal effect of
good management and an equilibrium relationship between joint outcomes of firms’ profit maxi-
mization. Instead, we view our baseline findings as conditional correlations that inform the mecha-
nisms through which management operates. In a step towards causality, we provide consistent panel
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evidence based on changes within US firms over time, which is not fully immune to endogeneity
concerns. We are able to convincingly establish causal effects for the subset of firm outcomes that
are also observed in the India RCT.
Our findings address two open questions in two active literatures. A large theoretical and em-
pirical literature in international trade emphasizes the role of firm productivity as a key determinant
of export performance (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003). More produc-
tive firms have been found to export more products to more destinations, thereby generating higher
export revenues and profits. This body of work conceptualizes firm productivity as TFPQ, or the
ability to manufacture at low marginal cost, such that more productive firms are more successful
exporters because they set lower prices. Recent analyses point to the importance of product quality
as well, showing that more successful exporters use higher-quality manufactured inputs and more
skilled workers to produce higher-quality output that sells at higher prices (Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler
and Verhoogen, 2012; Khandelwal, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen,
2018). Yet productivity is typically measured as TFPR, or a revenue-based residual from production
function estimates. This exposes it to estimation bias, and complicates the interpretation of trade-
TFPR regression results (Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer, 2015; De Loecker, 2011). An important
open question in this literature is what constitutes productivity, how it should be measured, and what
explains its dispersion across firms. We unpack the black box of TFPR, and identify management
practices as a concrete, tangible and directly measured TFPQ component that circumvents estima-
tion concerns. Moreover, this management component accounts for a large share of the variation in
firms’ trade performance, and delivers clear policy lessons.
A separate and older literature has examined the relationship between firm management, pro-
ductivity and performance (Walker, 1887; Syverson, 2011). One likely route for this management-
productivity link emphasized by the management literature is through lean manufacturing and im-
proved quality (Drew, McCallum, and Roggenhofer, 2016; Sutton, 2007). Yet there is no systematic,
direct evidence on the mechanisms through which management operates.1 We demonstrate that ef-
1The most popular management systems - Six-Sigma, Lean, and the Toyota Production System
- all emphasize that improving productivity and quality is best achieved by an ongoing focus on
reducing defects. In fact, this approach is now so popular that it has spread from manufacturing
across most sectors, for example to Lean Retail (Myerson, 2014), Lean Healthcare (Group, 2014)
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fective management enhances firms’ trade performance through both higher production efficiency
and stronger quality capability.
This paper also adds to recent research on the impact of trade liberalization on the organization
of production inside firms. Evidence indicates that trade reforms incentivize firms to change the
number of management layers, adjust the number and wages of managers and workers along the
occupational hierarchy, and upgrade management practices (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012;
Chen and Steinwender, 2016; Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018). At the same time, improved access
to imported inputs is important to the product quality, product scope and export success of firms
in developing countries, because of the limited domestic supply of high-quality specialized inputs
and equipment (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010; Fieler, Eslava, and Xu, 2018;
Manova and Zhang, 2012). This matters since poor economies often rely on international trade for
growth, and specifically on exporting to large, developed and profitable markets that maintain high
quality standards. Our results suggest that poor managerial practices may impede trade, growth and
entrepreneurship in the world’s poorest economies.
Finally, our findings speak to the literature on the implications of firm heterogeneity for aggre-
gate productivity, welfare and the gains from trade (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodrı́guez-Clare, 2012; Melitz and Redding, 2013). Evidence indicates that reallocations across
firms and across products within firms, as well as productivity upgrading within firms, contribute sig-
nificantly to the aggregate adjustment to trade reforms and macroeconomic shocks (Pavcnik, 2002;
Bustos, 2011). The role of management practices for firm heterogeneity is thus important for un-
derstanding trade’s aggregate impact, while the associated firm hetetorogeneity in worker skill and
product quality matters for its distributional effects (Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides RCT evidence for the causal effects of
management in India. Section 3 develops a stylized model that rationalizes this evidence and delivers
rich additional predictions for the role of management competence. Section 4 introduces the unique
Chinese and US data on firm management, production and trade that allow us to evaluate all model
predictions. Section 5 examines the relationship between firms’ management strategy and export
performance, while Section 6 analyzes the mechanisms through which management operates. The
last section concludes.
and even Lean Government (Teeuwen, 2010).
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2 Motivating RCT Evidence
We first present motivating evidence that management practices can exert causal effects on firms’
production efficiency, quality capacity, and export activity. We exploit a randomized control trial
performed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) who worked with the com-
pany Accenture to provide free management consulting services to large firms in the textile industry
in Mumbai, India.2 The study examined three sets of plants over the 2008-2011 period. 11 plants
owned by 6 firms served as a pure control group and 20 plants owned by 11 firms as the treatment
group. In the treated group, 14 plants were randomly selected to receive the management interven-
tion. They had 1 month of diagnostic assessment of management practices in place and 4 months
of consulting on 38 core practices across 6 key areas (factory operations, quality control, inventory
control, loom planning, human resources, sales and orders). The remaining 6 plants in the treated
firms were given only the 1-month diagnostic. Detailed monthly production data was collected for
all three groups for a further 3 years. In 2017, Bloom, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (ming)
went back to assess the long-term impact of the intervention. They collected performance metrics
for 2014 and 2017, including trade activity that we are the first to analyze.
Three lessons emerge from the India RCT. First, the consulting intervention had a large long-
lasting effect on firms’ management strategy. The management practice adoption rate in the treat-
ment plants rose from 25.6% to 63.4% in the first year, slipped somewhat over the next eight years
to 46%, but remained significantly above its initial level or the control firms.
Second, the management intervention led to a large causal improvement in firms’ TFP and prod-
uct quality. Figures 1a and 1b plot the change in TFP and product defect rates during the experiment
against the change in management competence for both treatment and control plants. The interven-
tion triggered a 37.8% rise in management effectiveness on average. This caused a 43% drop in
quality defects, and was one of the major drivers of the 17% increase in TFP.
Third, the management intervention significantly increased firms’ export participation. In Panel
A of Table 1, we explore the intention-to-treat effect with regressions of various export outcomes
on a plant-level treatment dummy. Treatment plants were 0.189 more likely to export in the post-
2See McKenzie and Woodruff (2013) for a review of the literature on management RCTs and the
impact of management intereventions on firm productivity.
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treatment period, and had significantly higher export revenues conditional on exporting (up to 51.6%
increase). We document similarly strong positive impacts in Panel B, where we use the treatment
indicator as an instrument for the management score in a two-stage IV specification.
The key determinant of exports were management practices that guarantee quality control. In-
ternational buyers offer higher prices than domestic consumers, but impose higher quality standards
that require formal quality control systems. While domestic consumers will accept (at a discount)
fabric with slight imperfections - stains, inconsistent coloring, holes or bunching, international buy-
ers will not and defective shipments are returned.
This RCT evidence indicates that upgrading management strategies can improve firms’ TFP,
product quality, production efficiency, and export performance. This motivates the model in Section
3. While the India RCT supports causal interpretation, however, it covers a small set of establish-
ments, tracks only basic export outcomes, and does not link efficiency and quality to export success.
In Sections 4-6, we therefore exploit significantly richer data for China and the US to establish a
broad set of novel conditional correlations in line with the model’s predictions and mechanisms.
3 Conceptual Framework
We develop a partial-equilibrium heterogeneous-firm trade model in which management competence
enhances firms’ trade performance by increasing production efficiency and quality capacity. This
model rationalizes the RCT evidence for India, and delivers a broad set of additional predictions that
we can take to administrative data for China and the US.
We treat management effectiveness as an exogenous firm draw that is conceptually equivalent to
TFP. This reduced-form formulation lends tractability and transparency, and is consistent with dif-
ferent micro-foundations for the role of management practices, such as monitoring under principal-
agent problems, span of control trade-offs in delegation hierarchies, and dynamic incentives with
career concerns (Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and Roberts, 2013). Since the baseline model shares
many properties with Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and most
closely Manova and Yu (2017), we summarize its key features here, and relegate further details and
proofs to Online Appendix 1 and 2.
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3.1 Economic Environment
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms in country j ∈ J+1 can produce and export hor-







ticity of substitution σ ≡ 1/(1−α) > 1, demand for variety i in market j is xji = RjP σ−1j qσ−1ji p−σji ,










is a quality-adjusted ideal price in-
dex, and qji, pji and xji are the quality, price and quantity of variety i ∈ Ωj . Product quality captures
any objective attribute or subjective taste preference that increases consumer appeal at a given price.
A sufficient statistic for unobserved quality ln qji can thus be constructed from observed price and
quantity data as σ ln pji + lnxji (Khandelwal, 2010).
Upon paying a sunk entry cost, firms draw firm-wide managerial ability ϕ ∈ (0,∞) from distri-
bution g(ϕ) and a vector of i.i.d. firm-product specific expertise levels λi ∈ (0,∞) from distribution
z(λ). As we show in Online Appendix 3.1 and 3.2, the main model predictions hold if firms could
endogenously choose their management practices or managerial strategy were one of multiple com-
ponents of firm ability.3,4
Firms’ management competence determines both their ability to assemble inputs into final goods
(production efficiency) and their capacity to make high-quality goods (quality capacity). Producing
one unit of physical output requires (ϕλi)
−δ units of labor with wage normalized to 1. Parameter δ >
0 governs the extent to which good management lowers unit input requirements. Intuitively, effective
management can improve production efficiency by optimizing inventory control, synchronizing and
monitoring production targets across manufacturing stages, reducing wastage, incentivizing workers,
etc.
3For example, entrepreneurs might receive an exogenous talent draw φ, adopt management
practice m (φ) at cost fm, and face marginal costs and quality that depend on overall ability
ϕ = φm (φ)λi. If dfm/dm > 0 and d2fm/dm2 > 0, then Propositions 1-4 hold for both ϕ and
m (φ).
4With multiple productivity components, firm ability ϕ = m·φmay depend on the entrepreneur’s
talent φ and the manager’s competence for effective management m. If entrepreneurs and managers
do not match perfectly assortatively due to labor market frictions, then |corr(m,φ)| 6= 1. While all
firm outcomes would now be pinned down by ϕ instead of m alone, management competence would
have the same effects as in our baseline model ceteris paribus.
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At a marginal cost of (ϕλi)
θ−δ workers, firms can produce one unit of quality qi (ϕ, λi) = (ϕλi)
θ,
θ > 0. This captures the idea that manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated with higher
marginal costs because it requires higher-quality inputs and more complex assembly processes
(Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). For example, making a high-quality dress using skilled labor, silk
and pearl buttons entails more expensive inputs than making a low-quality dress using unskilled
labor, cotton and plastic buttons. Similarly, a 50-part printer might be able only to print, while a
150-part model might be more difficult to build but print, scan and fax. Online Appendix 3.3 formal-
izes these micro-foundations: Production complementarity between firm ability and input quality
induces more capable firms to use higher-quality inputs and produce higher-quality outputs (Kugler
and Verhoogen, 2012). Parameter θ reflects the degree to which superior management enhances
firms’ capacity to produce higher quality. Intuitively, effective management can tighten quality con-
trol, ensure the compatibility of specialized inputs, facilitate complex assembly, minimize costly
mistakes, etc.
3.2 Firm Behavior
Firms maximize profits from their global operations by making optimal entry and sales decisions
separately for each country-product market.5 Producers charge a constant mark-up 1
α
over marginal
cost, and have the following price, quantity, quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for
product i in market j:
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δ(σ−1) , πji (ϕ, λi) =
rji (ϕ, λi)
σ
− fpj , (3)
where τ j are iceberg costs, and fpj are destination-product fixed costs. Note that the empirical





rfobji (ϕ, λi) = Rj (Pjα)
σ−1 (ϕλi)
δ(σ−1).
5See Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015) for an alternative framework with cannibaliza-
tion effects across products within firms, in which Propositions 1-4 would still hold.
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Management competence exerts two opposing effects on firms’ marginal costs and prices through
the production efficiency and quality capacity channels. Their net effect is theoretically ambiguous
and depends on the magnitudes of θ and δ. If θ = 0 and δ > 0, effective management improves
firm efficiency but there is no scope for quality differentiation. Better managed firms then have
lower marginal costs, set lower prices, sell higher quantities, and earn higher revenues and profits.
Conversely, if θ > 0 and δ = 0, management competence improves product quality but the efficiency
mechanism is moot. Now all firms share the same quality-adjusted prices, revenues and profits, but
better managed companies charge higher prices, offer higher quality, and sell lower quantities.
When θ > 0 and δ > 0, both management mechanisms are active. In this case, superior manage-
ment is associated with higher product quality, lower quality-adjusted prices, higher revenues and
higher profits. However, the implications for price and quantity remain ambiguous. If θ > δ, as man-
agement competence grows, product quality rises sufficiently quickly with the cost of sophisticated
inputs and assembly to overturn the effects of improved efficiency. As a result, effective management
corresponds to higher output prices. If θ < δ by contrast, good management practices translate into
lower prices. In the knife-edge case of θ = δ, production efficiency and product quality are equally
elastic in management capacity, and prices are invariant across the firm management distribution.
Finally, better managed firms sell higher quantities if and only if σδ > θ.
In sum, well-run companies perform better along multiple dimensions. Since profits rise with
managerial competence ϕ and there are economies of scale (i.e. headquarter-, product- and market-
specific fixed costs), there is a zero-profit expertise level λ∗j (ϕ) below which firm ϕ will not sell
product i in country j, where dλ∗j (ϕ) /dϕ < 0. In addition, only firms with management ability
above a zero-profit cut-off ϕ∗j will serve destination j, where ϕ
∗
j depends on j’s market size and trade
costs. On the extensive margin, better managed firms thus optimally manufacture more products,
select into exporting, serve more export destinations, and sell more products to each destination. On
the intensive margin, they earn higher revenues and profits overall, as well as in each market.
3.3 Empirical Predictions
Proposition 1 Better managed firms are more likely to export.
Proposition 2 Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets and earn
higher export revenues and profits.
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Proposition 3 Better managed firms offer higher-quality products if θ > 0 and the quality channel is
active, but quality is invariant across firms if θ = 0. Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted
prices if δ > 0 and the efficiency channel is active, but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across
firms if δ = 0. Better managed firms charge higher prices if θ > δ and lower prices if δ > θ, but
prices are invariant across firms if θ = δ.
Proposition 4 Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or more ex-
pensive assembly of higher complexity if θ > 0 and the quality channel is active, but input quality
and assembly complexity are invariant across firms if θ = 0.
4 Data
Our analysis makes use of unique, matched establishment- or firm-level data for the world’s two
largest exporters - China and the US - on production, international trade, and management practices.
We exploit six proprietary micro data sources, three for each country, to assemble a dataset that
is unprecedented in its coverage and detail. This section describes how management practices are
evaluated, introduces the data, and summarizes key features of firm activity.
4.1 Measuring Management Practices
Systematic data on firms’ management practices have only recently become available. Since 2004,
the World Management Survey (WMS) has developed standardized measures of management com-
petence for over 20,000 manufacturing firms in 34 countries. WMS considers multiple aspects of
firm management, and evaluates the relative effectiveness of different practices within each aspect.
It is conducted via double-blind phone interviews with plant managers, and covers representative
firm samples with 100 to 5,000 employees in a large number of countries (Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007). Endorsements by respected institutions and highly-trained interviewers (e.g. MBAs) ensure
high response rates (e.g. 45% in China). The Management and Organizational Practices Survey
(MOPS) is modeled after WMS. It was introduced as a mandatory part of the US Census’ Annual
Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) in 2010, the first and only census management data of its kind.
WMS (MOPS) includes 18 (16) questions about the management of physical capital (monitoring
and targets) and human resources (incentives) inside a firm, examples of which appear in Appendix
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Figure 1. A first set of questions pertain to the monitoring of progress towards production targets
via the frequent collection, analysis and dissemination of performance metrics. A second set of
questions characterize the design, integration and realism of production targets. These questions
assess to what extent targets are consistently set across production stages and tightly connected to
performance, both in the short-run and long-run, for managers and non-managers. A final set of
questions capture the use of incentives mechanisms to identify, promote and reward high performers
with bonuses, while sanctioning underperformers.
Each management question is scored on a scale of 1 to 5 in WMS and 0 to 1 in MOPS, with
higher values indicating more structured management involving greater monitoring, more aggressive
targets, and stronger performance incentives. For each country, we first standardize the responses
to each question across all firms to be mean 0 with standard deviation 1. We then average across
questions to obtain a comprehensive management score for each firm. Finally, we standardize these
management scores across firms in each country to be mean 0 and have standard deviation 1.
Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the vast dispersion in average management practices across coun-
tries in WMS. The US comes out on top, followed closely by Japan, Germany, Sweden, Canada and
the UK. In the middle of the country distribution, Chinese firms are on average significantly less
well managed than North American and European companies, but score better than firms in Latin
America, Africa and other emerging giants such as Brazil and India.
WMS and MOPS are based on the lean manufacturing and modern human resource practices
used by leading management consultants, to focus on core management practices that should benefit
firm performance regardless of the industry or economic environment. Our analysis will account for
the possibility that the relevance of specific management practices might vary across industries with
industry fixed effects. To the extent that the management surveys are biased towards successful pro-
duction practices in the West, measurement error would introduce downward bias and work against
us finding consistent patterns for both China and the US.
4.2 United States
We employ three comprehensive datasets on the activities of US firms. First, MOPS documents the
management practices of about 32,000 manufacturing establishments in 2010 and 2005 (as recall).
The sample captures 5.6 million employees, or over half of US manufacturing employment. Figure
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2A plots the distribution of the management score across plants. MOPS also includes variables that
we use as noise controls, namely an indicator for filing census forms online, the tenure and seniority
of the respondent, and the discrepancy between employment data in MOPS and ASM.
Second, we obtain standard accounting data on US establishments from ASM, available for 1973-
2012.6 ASM records the total output, value added, profits and production inputs (e.g. employment,
capital expenditure, energy use, materials purchases) for about 45,000 plants that correspond to over
10,000 firms. We also observe firms’ age, location (out of 50 states), and primary industry of activity
in the US NAICS 6-digit classification.
Third, we use the US Longitudinal Federal Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which contains
detailed information about the universe of US international trade transactions in 1992-2012, at over
100 million transactions a year. LFTTD reports the value, quantity, unit (e.g. dozens, kilograms,
etc.) and organization (intra-firm vs. arm’s length) of all firm-level exports (free on board) and all
firm-level imports (cost, insurance and freight included) by country and product for around 7,000
different products in the 10-digit Harmonized System and around 5,000 product categories at the
HS 8-digit level. We proxy prices with transaction-level unit values, and define products by both
their HS code and unit to ensure comparability. Given the lumpiness and seasonality of international
trade, we work at the annual frequency.
We link ASM, LFTTD and MOPS using firms’ common tax identifier.7 We perform our baseline
analysis for the cross-section of about 32,000 US establishments in 2010 with contemporaneous pro-
duction, trade and management data. Firms in this matched sample are on average bigger and better
performing than firms without management data, but appear representative in that the relationship
between standard productivity, size and performance metrics is the same in both subsamples.
6MOPS was part of the 2009-2013 ASM panel in 2010, so all MOPS establishments were sur-
veyed annually in 2009-2013. In prior years, establishments were surveyed in the Economic Census
in years ending in ”2” or ”7” and if they were part of that year’s ASM panel. Since ASM over-
samples larger establishments, it tends to include a large share of export activity.
7We sum ASM production variables across establishments within multi-establishment firms. We
take the employment-weighted average MOPS management score across plants within a firm; all
results hold for the simple average. We use the age, location and industry of the firm headquarters.
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4.3 China
We also exploit three comprehensive firm datasets for China. First, WMS reports the management
practices of 507 Chinese firms in 2006-2007. Figure 2B plots the distribution of the management
score across firms. We use WMS data on firms’ primary industry (out of 82 SIC 3-digit industries)
and a set of survey noise controls (interview duration, day of week and time of day; interviewer ID;
interviewee gender, reliability and competence as perceived by the interviewer).
Second, we access firm-level production data for 1999-2007 from China’s Annual Survey of
Industrial Enterprises (ASIE). ASIE is collected by the National Bureau of Statistics and provides
standard accounting information for all state-owned firms and all private firms with sales above 5
million Chinese Yuan, for over 200,000 firms a year. In addition to output, profits, value added and
production inputs, we also observe firms’ age, ownership structure (private domestic, state owned,
foreign owned), location (out of 31 provinces), and primary industry of activity.
Third, we utilize comprehensive data on the universe of Chinese firms’ cross-border transactions
in 2000-2008 from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), spanning over 100 million trans-
actions a year. CCTS is collected by the Chinese Customs Office and reports the value and quantity
of firm exports (free on board) and imports (cost, insurance and freight included) in U.S. dollars
by product and trade partner for 243 destination/source countries and about 7,500 products in the
8-digit Harmonized System.8 While CCTS does not distinguish between arm’s-length and intra-firm
flows, it indicates the trade regime of each transaction (ordinary or processing trade).
Of the 507 Chinese firms in WMS, we are able to match 485 to ASIE using a common firm iden-
tifier. We obtain the complete ASIE record for these 485 firms during 1999-2007, which produces
an unbalanced panel of 3,233 firm-year observations.
Since CCTS maintains an independent system of firm registration codes, it cannot be mapped
directly into ASIE or WMS. We follow standard practice in the literature and match CCTS to ASIE
using an algorithm based on firms’ name, address and phone number. Using ASIE as a bridge, we
match 296 companies from WMS to CCTS. We then match 58 of the remaining unmatched firms in
WMS directly to CCTS by postcode and name. We ensure match quality by manually researching
8While the HS 6-digit classification is consistent across countries, finer levels of disaggregation
are not. Our baseline results at the HS-8 level hold at the HS-6 level, as well as at the most disag-
gregated HS-10 level (available for the US).
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company webpages and reports. We thus locate detailed CCTS trade data for 354 of the 507 WMS
companies, for a match rate of 70%. Of these 354 firms, 11% only export, 17% only import, and
72% both export and import according to CCTS. This is consistent with the fact that about 60%
of the matched WMS-ASIE firms report positive exports on their accounts, while more firms may
appear in the comprehensive CCTS records.
4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the substantial variation in management practices, production and trade activity
across firms in China and the US. Starting with the US, 45% of the 32,000 establishments in our
2010 matched sample export. The typical exporter sells 19 different HS-8 digit products to 13
destinations and, conditional on importing inputs, buys 20 distinct products from 6 countries, with
large dispersion around these means.9 These numbers are generally similar for the sample of 485
firms in our baseline 2000-2008 panel for China, where 58% of all firms export. On average, Chinese
exporters ship 9 HS-8 digit products to 13 markets and, conditional on importing inputs, sources 33
different products from 6 origins.
Table 2 corroborates stylized facts in the literature that exporters are on average larger and more
productive than non-exporters. We document that exporters are on average also better managed than
non-exporters: The unconditional export management premium equals 15% of a standard deviation
in China and 38% of a standard deviation in the US. In comparison, the export size premia in China
and the US stand at 19% and 186% respectively based on firm output and 36% and 123% based on
employment.10
9For the US, we report summary statistics for production at the establishment level and trade
activity at the firm level, since this is the level at which such data are collected in ASM and LFTTD
respectively. The ASM statistics look similar at the firm level.
10Firms are on average bigger in the Chinese sample than in the US sample because WMS covers
a randomized sample of Chinese firms above a size threshold, while MOPS has comprehensive
coverage of US firms.
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5 Management and Export Performance
In this section, we first examine the relationship between firms’ management practices and export
performance. This exercise constitutes a direct test of Propositions 1 and 2. To inform the effi-
ciency and quality mechanisms through which management operates, in Section 5 we then confront
Propositions 3 and 4 with data.
We perform the entire analysis separately for China and the US. Given the vast difference in
income, institutional quality and factor market frictions between the two countries, this allows us
to assess whether management plays a fundamental role in firm activities, and if so, whether its
function depends on the specific economic environment. To the extent that the management surveys
are biased towards successful production practices in the West, measurement error would introduce
downward bias and work against us finding consistent patterns for both China and the US.
5.1 Empirical Strategy
We evaluate the empirical validity of Propositions 1 and 2 with the following estimating equation
for the link between firms’ management competence and export performance:
ExportOutcomef = βManagementf + ΓZf + φl + φi + εf (4)
We consider multiple dimensions of export activity as guided by theory. In different specifica-
tions, ExportOutcomef refers to firm f ’s export status, log global export revenues, and various ex-
tensive and intensive margins of exporting. We measure f ’s managerial competenceManagementf
with the comprehensive management z-score.
We account for any systematic variation in supply and demand conditions across firms in the
same location l or industry i with fixed effects, φl and φi. These capture differences in factor costs,
factor intensities, infrastructure, institutional frictions, tax treatment, etc. that might impact export
performance. In the case of China, we add dummies for 31 provinces and 82 SIC 3-digit sectors. In
the case of the US, we use indicators for 50 states and about 300 NAICS 6-digit industries.
We further condition on a vector of firm characteristics Zf . We always include the full set
of survey noise controls to alleviate potential measurement error in Managementf . We subsume
the role of Chinese firms’ ownership type with fixed effects for private domestic, state owned, and
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foreign owned companies; such data is not available for the US. We also report results with an
extended set of firm controls Zf such as age, capital and skill intensity.
The coefficient of interest β reflects the sign of the conditional correlation between firms’ man-
agement competence and export performance. Given the fixed-effects structure, it is identified from
the variation across companies within narrow segments of the economy. This correlation can be
interpreted in two ways through the lens of our model. On the one hand, management excellence
may be an exogenous productivity draw or one component of it as in our baseline model, such as
managers’ exogenous ability or style (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). In this case, β would capture the
causal impact of management on export success. On the other hand, a primitive firm attribute may
determine both the choice of management technology and trade activity, for example if exogenously
different entrepreneurs endogenously hire managers of different skill levels. Estimates of β would
then reflect the equilibrium relationship between a production input and output that are joint out-
comes of the firm’s maximization problem. These two alternatives are isomorphic for our purposes
and we do not seek to distinguish between them.11
MOPS spans over 10,000 US firms in 2010, and we estimate equation (4) in this cross-section. By
contrast, WMS covers only about 500 Chinese firms in 2007. In order to fully exploit the information
in the Chinese panel customs and production data, we estimate specification (4) at the firm-year level,
controlling for changes in macroeconomic conditions with year fixed effects φt. This is motivated
by the evidence in Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Patnaik, Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen
(2019) and patterns in our own MOPS data that management practices evolve slowly within firms
over time. We cluster standard errors by firm since Managementf is measured at the firm level.
5.2 Export Status, Revenues and Profits
We first establish in Table 3 that better managed firms are significantly more likely to export and earn
higher export revenues conditional on exporting. In Columns 1 and 5, we examine firms’ export sta-
tus by setting the dependent variableExportOutcomef to 1 if a firm reports any exports and 0 other-
11Reverse causality does not pose classical estimation bias: If higher export revenues induce firms
to upgrade management because of economies of scale, this would be consistent with our argument.
This mechanism may be amplified if firms learn about managerial practices from their foreign buyers
and markets (Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman, 2017).
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wise. We estimate equation (4) in the matched ASIE-WMS sample for China and the matched ASM-
MOPS sample for the US, respectively.12 Firms employing more effective management practices are
systematically more likely to enter foreign markets.13 In Columns 3 and 7, we then re-estimate spec-
ification (4) using the log value of global exports as the outcome variable ExportOutcomef in the
matched CCTS-WMS sample of Chinese exporters and the matched LFTTD-MOPS sample of US
exporters.14 Well-run exporters realize substantially higher sales abroad.
The strong association between management competence and export activity persists when we
add an extended set of firm characteristics Zf in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. We control for firm age using
information on the year of establishment from ASIE and ASM. We find some evidence that older
US manufacturers export more. We further condition on firms’ production technology as reflected
in their capital intensity (log net fixed assets per worker) and skill intensity (share of workers with
a college degree; log average wage). The results corroborate prior evidence in the literature that
more skill- and capital intensive firms are more active exporters, although the point estimates are not
always precisely estimated. To guard against omitted variable bias, we always include this broader
vector of controls Zf in the rest of the analysis.
Our findings point to potentially large economic consequences from improving management
practices. Based on the estimates with the extended set of controls, a one-standard-deviation rise
in the management z-score is associated with 5% higher probability of exporting and 23% higher
export revenues in China; these numbers are 3% and 37% for the US. Given the large management
gaps across countries in Appendix Figure 2, this implies that variations in management competence
could account for substantial differences in trade intensity across countries. These magnitudes are
also sizeable relative to the role of firm age, skill- and capital intensity (comparable statistics for
these are in the range of 2% to 28%).
In Appendix Table 1, we corroborate the baseline findings for the US with more stringent spec-
12For the US, we observe export status at the plant level from ASM and all other trade outcomes
at the firm level from LFTTD. We run the baseline regressions for export status at the plant level,
and note that corresponding coefficient magnitudes are 30%-50% higher at the firm level.
13We report OLS results, but similar patterns hold with other estimators such as Probit or Logit.
14We measure firms’ global exports based on the customs records that cover the universe of trade
transactions. Similar results hold for total exports as reported in production surveys.
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ifications that exploit available panel data.15 We first find similar resutls when we regress export
outcomes in year 2011 on firms’ management score in 2010. We then regress the change in trade ac-
tivity from 2005 to 2010 on the concurrent change in firms’ management competence. Within-firm
upgrading of management practices is associated with significant improvements in export perfor-
mance, controlling for state and industry fixed effects that now absorb divergent time trends. Point
estimates are typically an order of magnitude smaller, consistent with management exerting greater
effects on performance levels than growth rates.
In addition to export status and revenues, Proposition 2 also has implications for firms’ export
profits. While ASIE and ASM report firms’ consolidated global profits, in Appendix Table 2 we
exploit the available information as best we can to provide indicative evidence of a positive link
between effective management and export profits. We confirm that superior managerial practices
are associated with higher total profits. Morover, this holds even conditioning on domestic sales,
calculated as the difference between total turnover and total exports.
5.3 Extensive and Intensive Export Margins
As a first step to understanding the mechanisms through which management contributes to export
success, we decompose exporters’ trade activity into the number of foreign markets they enter and
the sales they make in each market. We find that better managed firms have the capacity both to
serve more export markets and to sell more in individual markets.
We measure the extensive margin of firm exports with the log number of destinations they supply,
the log number of products they ship to at least one country, and the log number of destination-
product markets they penetrate. We quantify the intensive margin with average log exports per
destination-product. We define products at the granular HS 8-digit level. We re-estimate equation
(4) using each export margin in place of ExportOutcomef , and report our findings in Table 4.
Appendix Table 3 contains symmetric regressions without the wider set of firm controls Zf .
We consistently observe positive significant coefficients on Managementf across all specifi-
cations (except for the intensive margin in China). For Chinese firms, a one-standard-deviation
improvement in managerial competence is associated with 19% more export destinations, 17% more
15In 2010 (2015), MOPS asked US firms about their management practices in both 2005 and 2010
(2010 and 2015). The contemporaneous and recall data for 2010 line up well.
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export products, 22% more destination-product markets, and 2% higher exports in the average mar-
ket (Columns 1-4). For American companies, these magnitudes stand respectively at 13%, 17%,
20%, and 18% (Columns 6-9). Overall, the extensive margin of market entry accounts for just over
half of the contribution of management to firm exports in the US and about 90% in China.16
These results are in line with the theoretical predictions for the margins of firms’ export activity
summarized in Proposition 2. As a check on internal consistency, we consider the variation in export
sales across a firm’s destination-product markets. In the model, exporters add foreign markets in
decreasing order of profitability. As a result, better managed firms serve more markets by entering
progressively smaller markets where they earn lower sales. Further analysis supports this composi-
tion effect. For each firm, we identify its largest destination-product market by sales revenues, and
regress log exports to this top market on Managementf . We obtain much larger coefficients than
those for the intensive margin that are significant for both China and the US (Columns 5 and 10). As
we replace the outcome variable with log average sales to the top two, top three, etc. export markets,
we record progressively lower point estimates as anticipated.
5.4 Exports vs. Domestic Activity
In theory, effective management improves firm performance both at home and abroad, such that
better managed firms have higher domestic sales, higher probability of exporting, and higher export
revenues. The elasticities of these three outcomes with respect to management differ and generally
depend on modeling assumptions about demand. In our CES set-up, strong management increases
firm revenues proportionately in all markets served, but it also induces entry into more markets. As
a result, total exports rise faster with management competence than domestic sales.
Appendix Table 4 corroborates these predictions in the data. Better managed firms do sell more
at home, with domestic sales twice as elastic as exports with respect to management in China and
about on par in the US. When we then control for log domestic sales in the regressions for firms’
export status, global export revenues and various export margins, we continue to record positive
significant coefficients on Managementf (except for the intensive margin in China as before).
16These calculations are based on comparing coefficients estimates in specifications for different
export outcomes, such as Column 8 of Tables 2 and 3.
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6 Management Mechanisms
Having established that advanced managerial practices are associated with superior export perfor-
mance, we next examine the mechanisms through which management operates. We first provide
evidence for the production efficiency and quality capacity channels. We then consider the relation-
ship between management competence and TFP. We conclude by exploring whether the returns to
management vary across management dimensions and segments of the economy.
6.1 Efficiency and Quality
To assess if effective management improves firms’ production efficiency, quality capacity or both,
we evaluate the empirical validity of Propositions 3 and 4. We establish robust patterns consistent
with management acting through both the efficiency and quality channels.
6.1.1 Structural Estimates
We first analyze the link between firms’ management practices, product quality, and quality-adjusted
prices per Proposition 3. We exploit the rich dimensionality of the data and examine firms’ behav-
ior in finely disaggregated export markets. This allows us to study the role of management while



















Through the lens of our model, coefficient βq identifies structural parameter θ, which governs the
effect of management on product quality. Similarly, coefficient βp/q identifies structural parameter
δ, which captures the effect of management on productive efficiency. According to Proposition 3,
βq > 0 and βp/q < 0 if and only if management operates through the quality and the efficiency
channel, respectively. Note this interpretation is conservative given the potential for variable mark-
ups.17
17If better managed firms set higher mark-ups, our conclusions for βq would be unaffected, but
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The unit of observation is now the firm–destination–HS8 product(-year). Pricefdp is the export
unit value that firm f charges for product p in destination d (in year t). We use free-on-board
export prices that exclude duties, transportation costs and retailers’ mark-up, such that Pricefdp
corresponds to the sum of f ’s marginal cost and mark-up. We construct model-consistent proxies
for firms’ export product quality and quality-adjusted price from their export prices and quantities by
product, destination (and year). Since ln qji ∝ σ ln p
fob
ji + lnxji, log quality ln qji can be inferred as
the sum of log quantity xji and log free-on-board price p
fob
ji , adjusted for the elasticity of substitution
across varieties σ. We set σ = 5 (the median in the literature), but our results are robust to alternative
values (Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013).
We continue to include location fixed effects φl and the full set of firm controls Zf , as well as
year fixed effects for China. Instead of fixed effects for firms’ primary industry, we now condition on
destination-product pair fixed effects φdp.18 These subsume variation in total expenditure, consumer
price indices and trade costs across countries and products in the model, as well as any differences
in consumer preferences, institutional frictions and other forces outside the model. In these stringent
specifications (5) and (6), the coefficient on Managementf is thus identified from the variation
across firms within narrow segments of the global economy, such as Chinese exporters of men’s
leather shoes to Germany or US exporters of cell phones to Japan. We conservatively cluster standard
errors by firm to accommodate correlated shocks across destinations and products within firms.
Equations (5) and (6) are in the spirit of prior studies of the relationship between measured firm
productivity (TFPR), prices and revenues (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Manova and Zhang, 2012).
Since these variables are all constructed from the same raw data on sales and quantities, a common
challenge in this literature has been ruling out estimation bias arising from correlated non-classical
measurement error in the right- and left-hand side variables. We circumvent this problem by using
direct measures of management practices that are entirely independent of the sales and quantity data.
The evidence in Table 5 lends strong support to managerial competence improving both pro-
duction efficiency and product quality. In both China and the US, management is associated with
significantly higher export quality (Columns 1 and 5) and significantly lower quality-adjusted prices
pfobji /qji would be inflated and we would be less likely to find β
p/q < 0.
18All results for China hold when we distinguish between processing and ordinary exports and
include a complete set of destination–product–trade regime triple fixed effects.
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(Columns 2 and 6). Formally, θCH = 0.531, δCH = 0.385, θUS = 0.048 and δUS = 0.045. Based on
these estimates, upgrading management by one standard deviation entails a 53% increase in prod-
uct quality and a 39% decline in quality-adjusted prices in China. These numbers are both 5% for
the US, such that quality and quality-adjusted prices are equally elastic with respect to management
competence. These patterns hold in panel data for the US (Appendix Table 1): Lagged manage-
ment practices are correlated with current efficiency and quality, and managerial improvements are
associated with efficiency and quality upgrading.
The results suggest that management may matter more for both productive efficiency and product
quality in China than in the US, δCH > δUS and θCH > θUS.One possible explanation is diminishing
returns to management, since management practices are on average worse in China. The estimates
also indicate that management may have a relatively bigger effect on quality than on efficiency in
China compared to the US, θCH−δCH > θUS−δUS = 0. We explore this further with the following










The relationship between prices and management is indeed significantly positive in China and in-
significantly different from 0 in the US (Columns 3 and 7). This suggests that when quality levels
are relatively low, improvements in managerial competence are likely to boost product quality much
more than efficiency. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Sutton (2007) that moving up the
quality ladder through better management practices is critical for emerging economies.
The elasticity of export quantity with respect to management is theoretically ambiguous, δσ−θ ≷
0. In practice, it is indistinguishable from 0 in China and positive in the US (Columns 4 and 8).
6.1.2 Robustness
We perform several specification checks to alleviate concerns with alternative interpretations of the
results for export prices and quality. First, qualitatively similar patterns obtain when we infer product
quality using alternative values for the price elasticity of demand σ = {4, 7, 10} instead of the
baseline σ = 5. The results also hold when we allow σ to vary across SIC 3-digit industries using
estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2006) (Panel A of Appendix Table 5).
Second, management practices may affect not only production efficiency and product quality,
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but also mark-ups; this channel is moot in our model because CES preferences imply constant mark-
ups. The prior literature has shown that in environments with variable mark-ups and no quality
differentiation, more productive firms charge lower prices even though they set higher mark-ups
(Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). With alternative market structures or strategic behavior, however,
mark-ups could in principle rise sufficiently quickly with productivity to dominate the associated
decline in marginal cost and result in higher prices. Under quality differentiation, variable mark-ups
might therefore confound the inference of quality from price and quantity data, and lead us to under-
or over-estimate the role of management effectiveness for firms’ quality capacity and production
efficiency. To alleviate this concern, we confirm that the results change little when we control for
firms’ market share as a proxy for their ability to extract higher mark-ups (Panel B of Appendix Table
5). We use a Chinese (US) firm’s share of total Chinese (US) exports to a given destination-product,
Exportsfdp∑
f Exportsfdp
, as an indicator of its market power there.
6.2 Input Characteristics
We next test the predictions of Proposition 4 for the quality of firms’ intermediate inputs and the
complexity of their assembly technology. We proxy the latter with input characteristics that we
construct from data on firms’ total material purchases (ASM/ASIE) and imported input purchases
by product and country of origin (LFTTD/CCTS). As common with production data, we do not
observe detailed information on domestic inputs.
We estimate specifications of the following two types:
InputCharacteristicf = βManagementf + ΓZf + φl + φi + εf (8)
InputCharacteristicfop = βManagementf + ΓZf + φl + φop + εfop (9)
As in equation (4), the unit of observation in regression (8) is the firm, and we include the same set
of controls (location and industry fixed effects, noise and firm controls). Similar to equation (5), the
unit of observation in regression (9) is the firm-origin country-product, and we condition on the same
controls (location fixed effects, origin country-product pair fixed effects, noise and firm controls).
We continue to cluster errors by firm and to exploit the panel for China, adding year fixed effects.
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6.2.1 Input Quality
In the model, producing goods of higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs. One
possibility is that this reflects the need for higher-quality intermediate inputs.19 Table 6 provides
evidence consistent with better managed firms sourcing more expensive, higher-quality inputs from
richer countries of origin (θ > 0).20 In Columns 1-2 and 6-7, we estimate regression (8) for the log
value of imports and the log share of imports in total input purchases. In both China and the US,
better managed firms have higher imports, consistent with their operating on a bigger scale and using
more inputs overall. Better managed Chinese producers also import a bigger share of their inputs, in
line with priors about the paucity of specialized, high-quality domestic inputs in China. By contrast,
the insignificant estimates for the US serve as a corroborating placebo test.
Columns 3 and 8 confirm that well-run companies source inputs from richer, more developed
economies. Such economies are believed to produce higher-quality, more sophisticated goods be-
cause they employ advanced technologies and more skilled workers (Schott, 2004). In these speci-
fications, the outcome variable is the weighted average log GDP per capita across a firm’s supplier
countries, using imports as weights. A one-standard-deviation rise in management competence is
associated with 4%-5% higher average origin-country income.
In Columns 4 and 9, we estimate regression (9) for the log unit value of firm imports by product
and country. Advanced management practices are accompanied by higher imported input prices in
China, but not in the US. In Columns 5 and 10, we find that better managed firms use higher-quality
imported inputs, where we infer imported-input quality in the same way as export product quality.
Improving management effectiveness by one standard deviation corresponds to 10% and 58% higher
imported-input price and quality in China, but only 0% and 5% in the US. Appendix Table 1 provides
consistent panel evidence for the US: Lagged management practices are strongly correlated with
current input sourcing strategies, and improvements in management quality are associated with input
19Recall the dress example: Following the same design and assembly steps, a producer can use
cheap cotton and plastic buttons to make a cheap, low-quality dress or expensive silk and pearl
buttons to make an expensive, high-quality dress.
20As we show in Appendix 2.3, one justification for the quality production function in our model
is complementarity between input quality and management competence in the production of output
quality. We find some evidence consistent with this mechanism in unreported results for the US.
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quality upgrading within firms over time.
These results suggest that at lower levels of management competence and product quality good
management can help firms to not only more effectively source and process inputs from advanced
countries, but also to better identify high-quality suppliers within each country. This additional
channel might contribute to the higher elasticity of output quality with respect to management doc-
umented above for China relative to the US.
6.2.2 Assembly Complexity
An alternative rationalization for higher marginal costs of producing higher-quality goods is that it
requires the coordination of multiple production stages and efficient inventorization to assemble a
wider range of specialized inputs (Johnson and Noguera, 2012). We proxy the complexity of firms’
assembly technology with the variety of their imported inputs, measured as the log number of HS-8
products, origin countries, or origin country-product pairs in a firm’s import portfolio. As Table 7
demonstrates, better managed companies indeed source more distinct inputs from more suppliers,
after conditioning on their log number of export products.
In light of Proposition 4, the patterns in Tables 5 and 6 support the idea that effective manage-
ment enables firms to produce higher-quality products using higher-quality inputs and more complex
production processes.
6.3 Management and TFP
The results indicate that successful export performance is closely related to the use of sophisticated
management practices. We now explore the relationship between management competence and firm
productivity.
Unlike the theoretical notion of quantity-based total factor productivity TFPQ, standard TFPR
measures are constructed from data on sales revenues and input costs. TFPR thus incorporates input
and output prices and mark-ups (De Loecker, 2011), which introduces bias in regressions of firm
outcomes such as export activity on TFPR. As a production function residual, TFPR also constitutes
a conceptual black box. Separately, TFPQ is the single attribute that determines all firm outcomes in
many models, while in practice TFPR is positively but imperfectly correlated with many firm metrics
(e.g., Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013)). This points to either measurement error in
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TFP and/or multiple firm attributes playing a role (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013).
We view management competence as a measurable, tangible counterpart to the theoretical con-
cept of TFPQ, or an important component of TFPQ. On the one hand, management practices are
measured independently from firms’ production and trade activity and immune to the estimation and
black-box concerns with standard productivity measures. On the other hand, TFPR is in principle
more comprehensive and reflects both management and non-management dimensions to productiv-
ity, albeit measured with error.
We investigate the relationship between observed management practices and estimated TFPR in
Table 8. We construct TFPRf as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) using survey data on firm sales,
capital expenditures, labor costs and material purchases, and accounting for differences in production
technology across industries and ownership types. Column 1 confirms that the conditional correla-
tion between Managementf and TFPRf is indeed strongly positive. Columns 2-3 then replicate
regression (4) for TFPRf in place of Managementf . TFPR enters positively and significantly,
except for Chinese firms’ export status.
We next decompose TFPRf into two components by regressing it on Managementf with no
other controls: the projection ontoManagementf and the residual term nonManagementTFPRf .
In Columns 4-12, we regress the full range of firms’ export and import outcomes on bothManagementf
and nonManagementTFPRf to assess their absolute and relative contribution.21 The bottom three
rows show what percent share of a 1-standard-deviation spread in each trade outcome can be ex-
plained by a 1-standard-deviation spread in each productivity component. We refer to this metric as
explanatory power, and also report its ratio across the two TFPR components.
We find that both productivity dimensions matter in an absolute sense, especially given the large
set of fixed effects included. The estimates for Managementf are similar to the baseline and al-
ways highly economically and statistically significant: its explanatory power is 4.5-19% (China) and
0.5%-13.1% (US) depending on the trade outcome. In a few instances, nonManagementTFPRf
is imprecisely estimated or plays a negligible role. The relative explanatory power ofManagementf
varies from 0.9 to 7.4 times that of nonManagementTFPRf for China, with an average ratio of
2.3. The two productivity components are of more comparable relevance in the US, where the ratio
varies from 0.4 to 5.5 with a mean of 1.3.
21We bootstrap standard errors to account for how nonManagementTFPRf is constructed.
26
6.4 Differential Returns to Management
A policy-relevant question is whether some managerial practices are more beneficial to firm perfor-
mance than others. Also of interest is whether effective management is especially crucial to firm
success in certain environments or segments of the economy. We now explore several dimensions
along which the returns to managerial competence may vary. While we find some degree of differ-
ential returns, it is limited in terms of magnitude or significance.
Management components We first unpack the role of different management practices. The base-
line management score aggregates information across 16 questions in the MOPS US survey and
18 questions in the WMS China survey. We group and average these questions into two sub-
components: Monitoringf reflects the management of physical capital, production inputs and pro-
duction processes through the setting of operation targets and monitoring progress towards these
targets, while Incentivesf captures the management of human resources through the provision of
effort- and performance based incentives.
In Table 9, we regress each trade outcome on Monitoringf and Incentivesf to gauge their
absolute and relative significance. We generally find qualitatively similar patterns for both sets of
management practices when considered one at a time. Monitoring strategies appear quantitatively
more important for firms’ overall export performance and specific efficiency and quality channels
in the US. By contrast, monitoring and incentives play comparable roles for overall export activity
in China, with incentives being more consequential for certain efficiency and quality dimensions.
Given the high correlation between Monitoringf and Incentivesf , the significance and differential
magnitude of the estimated elasticities are typically dampened in horse-race specifications with both
management components.
Country and industry heterogeneity China and the US have very different levels of economic
development, institutional efficiency, and average management competence. We find that the overall
export performance of Chinese and American firms is equally sensitive to good management in
terms of export entry and revenues. This points to a fundamental role for management, rather than
idiosyncracies of specific economic contexts. Yet the efficiency and quality returns to management
at the firm-product and firm-product-destination levels can be significantly bigger in China than in
the US, consistent with diminishing returns to management in improving production efficiency and
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quality capacity.
Unreported analysis confirms that our results are not driven by differences in the composition of
Chinese and US trade flows: Similar patterns obtain when we weight US export (import) regressions
at the firm-product and firm-country-product level by the number of Chinese exporters (importers)
in each HS-6 product or country-product market.
We also assess whether the importance of management strategies varies systematically across
products or industries (unreported). We expand specifications for export and import prices, quality
and qualiy-adjusted prices at the firm-product-country level to include the interaction ofManagementf
with various product and industry characteristics. Based on the Rauch (1999) indicator for product
differentiation at the HS-6 level, management practices matter more for firm efficiency and qual-
ity in differentiated rather than homogeneous goods in China, while the opposite holds for the US.
However, these patterns are often not statistically significant. Using industry measures at the ISIC-3
level from Braun (2003), management competence appears more closely associated with improved
efficiency and quality in less capital intensive and in more skill intensive sectors in China. The oppo-
site, if less significant pattern emerges for the US. We observe no systematic variation across sectors
with different advertising and R&D intensity.
Ownership structure Finally, we consider the relationship between firms’ ownership structure,
management practices and trade activity. This informs the potential for productivity-enhancing
spillovers in managerial know-how from multinational to domestic firms, as well as concerns about
poor management practices in state-owned firms.
The Chinese customs data distinguish between private domestic firms (DOM), state-owned enter-
prises (SOE), and affiliates of foreign multinationals (MNC). On average, MNCs are better managed
than DOMs, which are in turn better managed than SOEs. In unreported regressions, we find some
variation in the management elasticity of different trade outcomes across ownership types, but it is
rarely statistically significant.
The US customs data identify each firm-country-product level transaction as intra-firm or arm’s-
length. We label firms with at least one intra-firm transaction as multinational, whether they be
US- or foreign-owned. On average, MNCs are better managed than DOMs, and the management
elasticity of different trade outcomes is generally higher for MNCs.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines for the first time the role of management practices for firms’ trade activity.
We theoretically and empirically establish that management competence enhances firms’ production
efficiency and quality capacity, and thereby performance: It enables firms to more effectively source
foreign inputs and process them into higher-quality outputs, which in turn improves export perfor-
mance. Moreover, management practices have large explanatory power compared to the residual
non-management component of TFP.
We find that better management is associated with greater efficiency and quality in both China
and the US, and that it matters relatively more in China, especially for the quality channel. Given
the striking differences in economic and institutional development between these two countries, our
results suggest that management capability plays a fundamental role that is not specific to particular
economic environments. They also speak to policy concerns about the impact of limited management
know-how on structural transformation and moving up the quality ladder in developing economies.
More broadly, our findings shed light on the nature and consequences of firm heterogeneity. A
promising avenue for future work is uncovering the reasons for weaker managerial ability in some
firms and countries compared to others and the scope for policy interventions in this context.
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Dep Variable: Exporter Dummy
Log
(1+ Exports) Log Exports
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Intention to Treat (Reduced Form)
Treatment 0.189* 0.665** 0.416**
(1.78) (2.84) (3.77)
Panel B. Management Impact (IV 2nd Stage)
Management 0.899 3.16** 1.95**
(1.66) (2.44) (2.68)
1st Stage (Management on Treatment) 35.5 35.5 20.5
Data frequency Yearly Yearly Yearly
Years 2008,11,14,17 2008,11,14,17 2008,11,14,17
Firms 17 17 12
Plants 31 31 22
# Observations 109 109 66
Table 1. Motivating Evidence: India RCT, 2008-2017
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and trade
activity following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to
plants in the textile industry in India, 2008-2017. Results are at the plant-year level from
the long-run follow-up in Bloom et al. (2017) collecting yearly data. The pre-treatment
period is 2008, and the post-treatment period is 2011, 2014, and 2017. The sample
includes 14 intervention plants in treated firms that received both initial diagnostics and
management consulting, 6 non-intervention plants in treated firms that received only
initial diagnostics, and 11 control plants that received neither. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level using the
sample-size appropriate t-distribution tables.
Panel A. Characteristics of exporters and non-exporters
Exporters Non-exporters Exporters Non-exporters
# Observations 1,875 1,358 14,000 18,000
Management 0.06 -0.09 0.12 -0.26
Log Gross Output 11.72 11.55 10.6 9.55
Log Employment 6.46 6.15 4.76 3.96
TFPR 4.86 4.77 4.3 4.07
Log Value Added / L 3.73 3.95 5.04 4.78
Panel B. Firms' management, export and import activity
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
Management 0 1 0 1
# Export Observations 2,236 13,000
Log Exports 14.80 2.31 13.79 2.77
# Export Products 8.65 11.58 18.94 47.50
# Export Destinations 12.85 14.99 12.95 16.72
# Import Observations 2,048 10,000
Log Imports 13.87 2.97 13.93 2.96
# Import Products 33.45 51.43 19.67 43.09
# Import Origins 6.30 5.67 6.20 8.02
Table 2. Summary Statistics
This tables provides summary statistics. China: all firms in the matched
WMS-ASIE sample for 1999-2007 (Panel A) and all exporters in the
matched WMS-CCTS sample for 2000-2008 (Panel B). US: all plants in the
matched MOPS-ASM sample for 2010 (Panel A) and all exporting firms in




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.040** 0.048*** 0.260** 0.231* 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.488*** 0.373***
(2.30) (2.75) (2.14) (1.81) (13.92) (10.13) (21.72) (16.79)
Capital Intensity -0.010 0.145 -0.020*** 0.193***
(-0.76) (1.43) (-6.04) (7.35)
Wage 0.041* 0.401** 0.106*** 0.904***
(1.82) (2.17) (9.82) (11.84)
Age 0.030 0.153 0.044*** 0.411***
(1.53) (1.01) (11.47) (13.29)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.37
# observations 3,233 3,123 2,236 1,935 32,000 32,000 13,000 13,000
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, probability of exporting, and
global export revenues. In Columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all Chinese firms and US
establishments in the matched sample with balance sheet and management data, and the dependent
variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 for exporters. In Columns 3-4 and 7-8, the sample includes all
exporters in the matched sample with trade and management data, and the dependent variable is log total
exports. Management Score is the standardized average score across all questions about firms'
management practices. Capital Intensity is log net fixed asset per worker. Wage is log labor cost per
employee. Age is log firm age in years. All columns control for the share of workers with a college degree;
noise controls (interview duration and time of day; interviewer dummies; interviewee gender, reliability and
competence as perceived by the interviewer). All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm
province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status (private domestic, state-owned, foreign-owned).
All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. Standard errors
clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 3. Export Status and Export Revenues
US
Exporter Dummy Log ExportsExporter Dummy Log Exports
China
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Management 0.185*** 0.166*** 0.215*** 0.017 0.196* 0.134*** 0.165*** 0.195*** 0.177*** 0.320***
(2.80) (3.33) (2.89)  (0.20) (1.74) (13.08) (15.32) (15.13) (12.75) (16.05) 
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.37 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.36
# observations 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000
Table 4. Extensive and Intensive Margins of Exports
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the extensive and intensive margins of their
exports. The dependent variable is firms' log number of export destinations in Columns 1 and 6, log number of export products
in Columns 2 and 7, log number of destination-product pairs in Columns 3 and 8, log average exports per destination-product in
Columns 4 and 9, and log exports in a firm's highest-revenue destination-product in Columns 5 and 10. A product is HS 8-digit.
All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All regressions
for the US include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise
controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for
disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
China US

















CH - δCH θCH - δCH θUS - δUS θUS - δUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.531* -0.385* 0.146** -0.200 0.048*** -0.045*** 0.003 0.034***
(1.95) (-1.82) (2.16) (-1.49) (2.60) (-2.91) (0.68)   (2.83)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.83
# observations 58,101 58,101 58,101 58,101 290,000 290,000 290,000 290,000
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the price, quality, quality-adjusted
price and quantity of their exports. The dependent variable is log export product quality in Columns 1 and 5, quality-
adjusted log export unit value in Columns 2 and 6, log export unit value in Columns 3 and 7, and log export quantity
in Columns 4 and 8, by firm-destination-product. Quality is estimated as demand elasticity (set to 5) x unit value +
quantity as descrbed in the text. Structural Parameter is the model parameter identified from the reduced form
coefficient on Management . A product is HS 8-digit. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province,
destination-product pair, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and
destination-product pair. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as described in Table 3.
Standard errors clustered by firm. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 5. Production Efficiency and Product Quality
China US
Province, Dest-Product, Own, Year State, Dest-Product





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Management 0.550*** 0.222* 0.046** 0.101** 0.576*** 0.344*** -0.003 0.037*** -0.001 0.051**
(4.32) (1.86) (2.11) (2.36) (3.03) (11.83) (-0.03) (3.89) (-0.34) (2.55)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y -- -- Y Y Y -- --
Origin-Prod FE -- -- -- Y Y -- -- -- Y Y
R-squared 0.56 0.50 0.38 0.81 0.78 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.97 0.93
# observations 1,778 1,778 1,778 76,626 76,626 10,000 10,000 10,000 140,000 140,000
Table 6. Imported Input Quality
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and imported input quality. The dependent variable is log firm
imports in Columns 1 and 6, log share of imports in total intermediate inputs in Columns 2 and 7, log average GDP per capita across origin
countries in Columns 3 and 8, log import unit value by origin country-product in Columns 4 and 9, and log import product quality by origin
country-product in Columns 5 and 10. Quality is estimated as demand elasticity (set to 5) x unit value + quantity as described in the text. A
product is HS 8-digit. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the
US include fixed effects for firm state. Columns 1-3 and 6-8 include fixed effects for firm main industry (SIC-3 for China, NAICS-6 for the
US). Columns 4-5 and 9-10 include origin country-product pair fixed effects. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as
described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm in Columns 1-5 and 9-10 and robust in Columns 6-8. US sample sizes rounded for
disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Management 0.168*** 0.123* 0.145** 0.058*** 0.079*** 0.087***
(4.24) (1.82) (2.09) (7.41) (6.81) (6.97)
Log # Export 0.245*** 0.387*** 0.441*** 0.426*** 0.561*** 0.632***
Products (7.69) (6.97) (7.77) (66.14) (58.70) (60.40)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.56 0.51 0.53
# observations 1,566 1,566 1,566 10,000 10,000 10,000
Table 7. Assembly Complexity
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and imported
input complexity. The dependent variable is firms' log number of origin countries in
Columns 1 and 4, log number of imported products in Columns 2 and 5, and log number of
origin country-product pairs in Columns 3 and 6. A product is HS 8-digit. All regressions for
China include fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership
status. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6
industry. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as described in Table
3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for
disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level.
China US
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. China
Management 0.150*** 0.053* 0.261** 0.250** 0.520* -0.363 0.157 0.047*** 0.620*** 0.194 
(3.48) (1.74) (2.36) (2.08) (1.69) (-1.63) (0.74) (3.09) (9.66) (1.60)  
TFPR -0.006 0.274*** 
(-0.45) (3.54)
Non-Manage TFPR -0.006 0.257*** 0.139*** 0.242*** -0.192*** 0.049** -0.034** 0.410*** 0.117*** 
(-0.57) (4.07) (3.67) (2.62) (-2.66) (2.05) (-2.44) (67.17) (3.83)  
R-squared 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.38 0.78 0.60
# observations 2,800 2,802 1,880 2,800 1,880 1,880 54,565 54,565 54,565 1,731 70,270 1,731
Share of 1 st dev in outcome explained by 1 st dev in attribute: 
Management 10.7% 11.3% 19.0% 5.4% 4.8% 7.1% 9.1% 4.5% 12.2%
Non-Manage TFPR 1.5% 12.1% 11.5% 2.7% 2.8% 2.4% 7.1% 3.3% 8.1%
Ratio 7.4 0.9 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.9 1.3 1.4 1.5
Panel B. US
Management 0.090*** 0.031*** 0.364*** 0.191*** 0.042*** -0.046*** -0.004 0.037*** 0.050** 0.199***
(10.10) (9.72) (17.21) (14.81) (2.96) (-3.72) (-1.08) (4.12) (2.01) (13.64)
TFPR 0.040*** 0.307***
(11.49) (12.09)
Non-Manage TFPR 0.037*** 0.273*** 0.156*** 0.025** -0.024** 0.001 0.003 0.035*** 0.142***
(10.56) (10.79) (9.82) (2.14) (-2.45) (0.38) (0.37) (2.12) (8.38)
R-squared 0.83 0.28 0.38 0.28 0.41 0.39 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.21 0.93 0.34
# observations 32,000 32,000 13,000 32,000 13,000 13,000 290,000 290,000 290,000 10,000 140,000 10,000
Share of 1 st dev in outcome explained by 1 st dev in attribute: 
Management 6.2% 13.1% 11.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.1% 4.3% 0.7% 12.8%
Non-Manage TFPR 16.3% 22.2% 21.3% 0.7% 0.8% 0.1% 0.8% 1.1% 20.5%
Ratio 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.8 5.5 0.6 0.6
Table 8. Management vs. TFPR
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, total factor productivity, and trade activity. TFPR is revenue-based
TFP measured as in Levinsohn-Petrin. Non-Management TFPR is the residual from the regression of TFPR on management and no other
controls or fixed effects. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US
include fixed effects for firm state. Columns 1-6, 10 and 12 include fixed effects for firm main industry (SIC-3 for China, NAICS-6 for the US).
Columns 7-9 and 11 include destination or origin country-product pair fixed effects. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls
as described in Table 3. Standard errors boostrapped 600 times in Panel A and 1,000 times in Panel B. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure
reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. China: Estimation with Both Components
Monitoring 0.069*** 0.127 0.120 0.057 0.014 0.071 0.017 0.277 0.408***
(2.92) (0.75) (1.06) (0.19) (0.06) (1.06) (0.53) (0.98) (3.59)
Incentives -0.033 0.128 0.117 0.526* -0.432** 0.093 0.032 0.331 -0.168
(-0.58) (0.86) (1.15) (1.92) (-2.03) (1.40) (0.96) (1.24) (-1.53)
# observations 3,123 1,935 1,935 58,101 58,101 58,101 1,778 76,626 1,778
Panel B. China: Estimation with Single Component
Monitoring 0.060*** 0.217 0.202** 0.330 -0.211 0.119* 0.041* 0.521*** 0.287***
(3.48) (1.63) (2.55) (1.27) (-1.03) (1.95) (1.89) (2.67) (4.04)
Incentives 0.032* 0.211* 0.196*** 0.558** -0.424** 0.134** 0.044** 0.527*** 0.114
(3.48) (1.78) (2.77) (2.28) (-2.23) (2.18) (1.97) (2.88) (1.61)
# observations 3,123 1,935 1,935 58,101 58,101 58,101 1,778 76,626 1,778
Panel C. US: Estimation with Both Components
Monitoring 0.022*** 0.307*** 0.157*** 0.050** -0.050*** -0.005 0.045*** 0.052** 0.101***
(6.99) (13.11) (11.29) (2.56) (-3.88) (-1.10) (4.52) (2.57) (7.67)
Incentives 0.013*** 0.141*** 0.077*** 0.017 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.014 0.011
(4.63) (6.57) (6.04) (1.03) (-0.06) (0.16) (-0.29) (0.86) (0.88)
# observations 32,000 13,000 13,000 290,000 290,000 290,000 10,000 140,000 10,000
Panel D. US: Estimation with Single Component
Monitoring 0.026*** 0.335*** 0.173*** 0.038*** -0.037*** 0.001 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.201***
(8.64) (15.05) (13.19) (2.63) (-2.94) (0.30) (4.64) (2.84) (13.65)
Incentives 0.019*** 0.224*** 0.120*** 0.010 -0.012 -0.002 0.010 0.027* 0.104***
(6.97) (11.02) (9.98) (0.83) (-1.11) (-0.55) (1.07) (1.74) (7.62)
# observations 32,000 13,000 13,000 290,000 290,000 290,000 10,000 140,000 10,000
This table examines the role of the Monitoring and Incentives components of firms' management practices. All regressions for
China include fixed effects for firm province, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm
state. Columns 1-3, 7 and 9 include fixed effects for firm main industry (SIC-3 for China, NAICS-6 for the US). Columns 4-6 and 8
include destination or origin country-product pair fixed effects. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as
described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm, except for Columns 1, 2, 7 and 9 for the US where they are robust. US
sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level.
Table 9. Management Components
Export Performance Quality and Efficiency Imported Input Quality and Assembly Complexity
Figure 1A. Management and TFP
Figure 1B. Management and quality defects index
This figure displays how improvements in firms' management practices relate to
improvements in log total factor productivity (top) and quality control in production
(bottom) following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to
plants in the textile industry in India, 2008-2011. It plots the firm-by-week change in log
total factor productivity against the firm-by-week change in the management score (top)
and in the log quality defects index (bottom), both relative to their pre-experiment
average. The quality defects index measures the severity-weighted number of defects
per roll of fabric. See Bloom et al. (2013) for experiment details.
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Figure 2A. US MOPS
Figure 2B. China WMS
Figure 2. Management Practices across Firms
This figure plots the MOPS management score distribution for the US (top)
and the WMS management score distribution for China (bottom). The
management scores are averaged across all questions before being
normalized for the regression analysis.













This appendix provides the theoretical foundation for the companion paper. Section
1 develops an international trade model with multi-product heterogeneous firms in
which management competence determines firms’ production efficiency and quality
capacity. Section 2 presents formal proofs for this baseline model. Finally, Section 3
examines three model extensions that allow for an endogenous choice of management
practices, multiple components of firm ability, or an endogenous choice of input and
output quality.
∗We thank Rui Zhang and Xincheng Qiu of Peking University for their excellent research assistance for
this appendix.
†Kalina Manova (corresponding author): k.manova@ucl.ac.uk.
1 Baseline Model
We develop a theoretical model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms choose
how many products to manufacture, what markets to enter, and which products to sell in
each market. In the baseline set-up, firms receive an exogenous draw of management compe-
tence which uniquely determines firm choices and performance outcomes. We consider the
endogenous adoption of management practices in an extension to this benchmark model in
Section 3.1. We posit that effective management can enhance firm performance by increas-
ing production efficiency and/or quality capacity. We characterize the relationship between
firms’ management competence and trade activity under alternative assumptions about the
relative importance of these two channels, and derive testable predictions that allow us to
empirically assess their relevance in practice. We relegate all detailed proofs to Section 2.
We incorporate management competence in a partial-equilibrium trade model that fea-
tures quality and efficiency differentiation across firms and across products within multi-
product firms. In our baseline, we treat management effectiveness as equivalent to TFP,
such that our model closely resembles that in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), Kugler
and Verhoogen (2012), and most closely Manova and Yu (2017). We examine the alterna-
tive in which management practices are one of multiple components of firm productivity in
Section 3.2.
1.1 Set Up
Consider a world with J + 1 countries. In each country, a continuum of heterogeneous
firms produce horizontally and vertically differentiated goods which they sell at home and
potentially export abroad. Consumers exhibit love of variety such that the representative






, where qji and xji are the
quality and quantity consumed by country j of variety i, and Ωj is the set of goods available
to j. The elasticity of substitution across products is σ ≡ 1/(1 − α) > 1 with 0 < α < 1.
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is a quality-adjusted ideal price index and pji is the price
of variety i in country j. Quality is thus defined as any objective attribute, subjective taste
preference or other demand shock that increases the consumer appeal of a product given its
price. Note that a sufficient statistic for unobserved product quality ln qji within market j
can be constructed from observed price and quantity data as σ ln pji + ln xji, since Rj and
Pj do not vary across products sold in j (Khandelwal, 2010; Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei,
2013).
1.2 Production and Sales Technology
The production technology is characterized by a production function for physical units of out-
put and a production function for output quality. Firms’ management competence can affect
both the ability to assemble given inputs at low cost and the capacity to make high-quality
goods. We refer to these two mechanisms as production efficiency and quality capacity.
In order to begin manufacturing, entrepreneurs have to incur sunk entry costs associ-
ated with research and product development. They face uncertainty about their production
efficiency and product quality, and observe them only after completing this irreversible in-
vestment. At that point they decide whether to exit immediately or commence production
and possibly export.
Upon entry, firms draw firm-wide managerial ability ϕ ∈ (0,∞) from distribution g(ϕ)
and a vector of firm-product specific expertise levels λi ∈ (0,∞) from distribution z(λ). We
will think of better managed firms as having a higher ability draw ϕ. Since the success
of research and product development may differ across products within a firm, we assume
that g(ϕ) and z(λ) are independent of each other and common across firms with continuous
cumulative distribution functionsG(ϕ) and Z(λ) respectively, while λ is i.i.d. across products
and firms.
Producing one unit of physical output requires (ϕλi)
−δ units of labor whose wage is
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normalized to 1 to serve as the numeraire. The parameter δ > 0 governs the extent to which
good management practices can lower unit input requirements and increase the efficiency
with which these inputs are assembled into final goods. Intuitively, effective management can
improve production efficiency by optimizing inventory control, synchronizing and monitoring
production targets across manufacturing stages, reducing wastage, incentivizing workers, etc.
At a marginal cost of (ϕλi)
θ−δ workers, the firm produces one unit of product i with
quality qi (ϕ, λi) = (ϕλi)
θ, θ > 0. This reduced-form quality production function captures
the idea that manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs
because it requires the use of more complex assembly processes and more expensive inter-
mediate inputs of higher quality. For example, while sewing a dress using unskilled labor,
cotton and plastic buttons might entail the same assembly process as sewing a dress using
skilled labor, silk and mother-of-pearl buttons, the latter utilizes more expensive inputs and
is considered higher quality. Similarly, while a printer built from 50 components might only
be able to print, the sophisticated assembly of 150 parts might produce a multi-functional
printer that can print, scan and photocopy. The parameter θ reflects the degree to which
superior management enables firms to produce higher-quality products. Intuitively, effec-
tive management can enhance quality capacity by tightening quality control, facilitating
specialized assembly, minimizing costly mistakes, etc.
For expositional simplicity, we do not explicitly model firms’ input choice in our baseline
set-up, but follow Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) in assuming that product quality is fixed
by exogenous draws. In Section 3.3, we formally establish that endogenizing input quality
in a richer framework would preserve our theoretical predictions. Following Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012), we show how complementarity between firm ability and input quality in
the production function for output quality would induce more capable firms to use higher-
quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods.
Firms’ marginal cost thus reflects two opposing forces: On the one hand, better managed
firms have higher production efficiency. On the other hand, better managed firms produce
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higher quality using more expensive inputs and/or more complex assembly. The net effect
of these two forces on marginal costs is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the relative
magnitudes of θ and δ.
We make a number of standard assumptions about firms’ production and sales costs
that are motivated by salient patterns in the data. Firms incur a fixed operation cost of
headquarter services fh and a fixed overhead cost fp for each active product line, in units of
labor. This will imply that companies with different ability draws will choose to produce a
different number of products. Entering each foreign market j is associated with additional
headquarter services fhj necessary for complying with customs and other regulations, as well
as for the maintenance of distribution networks. As a result, some low-ability sellers in the
domestic market will not become exporters or will supply some but not all countries. Finally,
exporting entails destination-product specific fixed costs fpj (constant across products within
j, but varying across countries), which reflect market research, product customization and
standardization, and advertising. There are also variable transportation costs such that τ j
units of a good need to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive. These trade costs will ensure that
firms might not offer every product they sell at home in every foreign market they enter.
1.3 Profit Maximization
Firms must decide which products to produce, where to sell them and at what prices in
order to maximize profits from their global operations. With monopolistic competition and
a continuum of varieties, individual producers take all aggregate expenditures Rj and price
indices Pj as given, and separately maximize profits in each country-product market.
1 A
firm with management competence ϕ will choose the sales price and quantity of a product
1See Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015) and Eckel and Neary (2010) for an alternative model
which incorporates product cannibalization effects.
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with expertise draw λi in country j by solving
max
pji,xji
πji (ϕ, λi) = pji (ϕ, λi)xji (ϕ, λi)− τ jxji (ϕ, λi) (ϕλi)θ−δ − fpj (1.1)
s.t. xji (ϕ, λi) = RjP
σ−1
j qji (ϕ, λi)
σ−1 pji (ϕ, λi)
−σ .
Producers therefore charge a constant mark-up 1
α
over marginal cost, and have the fol-
lowing price, quantity, quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product i in
market j:













qi (ϕ, λi) = (ϕλi)















When j corresponds to the firm’s home market, there are no iceberg costs (τ j = 1) and
the destination-product fixed cost fpj is replaced by the product-specific overhead cost fp.
Note that the empirical analysis examines free-on-board export prices and revenues, that is




and rfobji (ϕ, λi) = Rj (Pjα)
σ−1 (ϕλi)
δ(σ−1).
If θ = 0 and δ > 0, effective management improves firm performance only by increasing
production efficiency but the quality channel is moot. The model then reduces to the BRS
framework in which all firms offer the same product quality level, but better managed firms
have lower marginal costs and therefore set lower prices, sell higher quantities, and earn
higher revenues and profits. While formally δ = 1 in BRS, this normalization is immaterial
when θ = 0.
Conversely, if θ > 0 and δ = 0, management competence benefits firm performance
by improving product quality but the production efficiency mechanism is not active. Now
all firms share the same quality-adjusted prices, revenues and profits, but better managed
companies charge higher prices, offer higher quality and sell lower quantities.
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The most interesting scenario arises when θ > 0 and δ > 0, such that management
operates through both the production efficiency and the product quality channels. We focus
on this scenario below as it is most relevant empirically. In this case, superior management is
unambiguously associated with higher product quality, lower quality-adjusted prices, higher
revenues and higher profits. However, the implications for quantity and price levels are
theoretically ambiguous. If θ > δ, as management competence grows, product quality rises
sufficiently quickly with the cost of sophisticated inputs and assembly to overturn the effects
of improved production efficiency. As a result, effective management corresponds to higher
output prices. If θ < δ by contrast, good management practices translate into lower prices.
In the knife-edge case of θ = δ, production efficiency and product quality are equally elastic
in management capacity, and prices are invariant across the firm management distribution.
Finally, better managed firms sell higher quantities if and only if σδ > θ.
1.4 Selection into Products and Markets
Consumers’ love of variety and the presence of product-specific overhead costs fp imply that
no firm will export a product without also selling it at home. In turn, firms optimally
manufacture only goods for which they can earn non-negative profits domestically. Since
profits increase with product expertise λi, there is a zero-profit expertise level λ
∗ (ϕ) for each
management ability draw ϕ below which firm ϕ will not make i. This value is defined by:
πd (ϕ, λ
∗ (ϕ)) = 0⇔ rd (ϕ, λ∗ (ϕ)) = σfp, (1.5)
where d indicates that revenues are calculated for the domestic market.
Recall that product expertise is independently and identically distributed across goods.
By the law of large numbers, the measure of varieties that a firm with ability ϕ pro-
duces equals the probability of an expertise draw above λ∗ (ϕ), or [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]. Since
dλ∗ (ϕ) /dϕ < 0, better managed firms have a lower zero-profit expertise cut-off and offer
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more products. One interpretation of this result is that better managed firms bring superior
quality control to any product line. This can partially offset using less skilled workers or
inputs of lower quality such that output quality and consumer appeal remain high.
Following the same logic, a firm with ability ϕ will export product i to country j only if
















. Since dλ∗j (ϕ) /dϕ < 0,
better managed firms export more products than worse run firms to any given destination.
When the exporting expertise cut-off lies above the zero-profit expertise cut-off, λ∗j (ϕ) >
λ∗ (ϕ), there will be selection into exporting. Across products within a firm, not all goods
sold at home will be shipped to j. Similarly, across firms supplying a product domestically,
not all will be able to market it abroad. Given the overwhelming evidence for both patterns
in the prior literature, we assume that λ∗j (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ) holds for all j.
For every management level ϕ, the expertise cut-off for exporting generally varies across
destinations because the market size Rj, price index Pj, variable τ j and fixed fpj trade
costs are country specific. Firms therefore adjust their product range across markets. Each
exporter follows a product hierarchy and adds goods in decreasing order of expertise until
it reaches the marginal product that brings zero profits. Within a supplier, higher-quality
goods are shipped to more countries, earn higher revenues in any given market, and generate
higher worldwide sales.
Firms enter a market only if total expected revenues there exceed all associated costs.




πj (ϕ, λ) z (λ) dλ− fhj. (1.7)
Export profits πj (ϕ) increase with management ability because better managed firms
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sell more products in j (i.e. lower λ∗j (ϕ)) and earn higher revenues from each good (i.e.
higher πj (ϕ, λ)) than firms with the same product expertise draws but worse management.







With asymmetric countries, ϕ∗j varies across destinations and better managed firms enter
more markets because they are above the export ability cut-off for more countries. Better
managed exporters thus outperform worse run producers along all three margins: number of
export destinations, product scope in each destination, and sales in each destination-product
market.
Finally, not all firms that incur the sunk cost of entry survive. Once they observe their
management ability and expertise draws, firms begin production only if their expected profits










πj (ϕ, λ) z (λ) dλ− fhj
)
− fh. (1.9)
The first integral in this expression captures the firm’s domestic profits from all products
above its expertise cut-off for production λ∗ (ϕ), while the summation represents worldwide
export profits from all traded products and destinations.
Total profits increase in ϕ because better managed firms sell more products domestically,
earn higher domestic revenues for each product, and have superior export performance as
described above. Companies below a minimum management level ϕ∗ are thus unable to
break even and exit immediately upon learning their attributes. This cut-off is defined by
the zero-profit condition:
π (ϕ∗) = 0. (1.10)
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1.5 Empirical Predictions
The following propositions summarize the key empirical predictions of the model.
Proposition 1 Better managed firms are more likely to export.
Proposition 2 Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets and
earn higher export revenues and profits.
Proposition 3 Better managed firms offer higher-quality products if θ > 0, but quality is
invariant across firms if θ = 0. Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted prices if
δ > 0, but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across firms if δ = 0. Better managed firms
charge higher prices if θ > δ and lower prices if δ > θ, but prices are invariant across firms
if θ = δ.
Proposition 4 Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or
more expensive assembly of higher complexity if θ > 0, but input quality and assembly com-
plexity are invariant across firms if θ = 0.
2 Detailed Proofs for Baseline Model
2.1 Set Up









where qji and xji are quality and quantity consumed by country j of variety i, and Ωj is the set
of goods available to j. The elasticity of substitution across products is σ = 1/ (1− α) > 1






















(pjixji) di = Rj. (2.3)

















































































adjusted ideal price index.
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2.2 Profit Maximization
Optimal firm behavior. Individual producers separately maximize profits for each destination-
product market by solving
max
pji,xji
πji = pjixji − τ jxji (ϕλi)θ−δ − fpj (2.9)







Product quality is exogenously determined by the quality production function as qji = qi =
(ϕλi)
θ. A producer with management competence ϕ and product expertise λi will therefore
charge a constant mark-up 1
α
over marginal cost and have the following price, quantity,
quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product i in market j:













qi (ϕ, λi) = (ϕλi)















Proof. Define the Lagrangian function as





θ(σ−1) p−σji − xji
)
. (2.13)
The first order conditions are:
∂L
∂xji
= pji − τ j (ϕλi)θ−δ − µ = 0, (2.14)
∂L
∂pji
= xji − σµRjP σ−1j (ϕλi)






θ(σ−1) p−σji − xji = 0. (2.16)
Plugging the second condition into the third one, one obtains pji = σµ. Substituting
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into the first condition, it follows that µ = τ j (ϕλi)
θ−δ /(σ − 1). Using simple algebra and
σ = 1/ (1− α) delivers the following expressions for the outcomes of interest:









xji (ϕ, λi) = RjP
σ−1
j (ϕλi)



























2.3 Selection into Products and Markets
Product expertise cut-off for production. Since profits πd (ϕ, λi) increase with product
expertise λi, there is a zero-profit expertise level λ
∗ (ϕ) for each management ability draw ϕ
below which the firm will not produce i for the domestic market. This cut-off is defined by
the zero-profit condition πd (ϕ, λ




Proof. The definition of the product expertise cut-off λ∗ (ϕ) delivers a closed-form solution
for it:
πd (ϕ, λ
∗ (ϕ)) = 0⇔ rd (ϕ, λ∗ (ϕ)) = Rd (Pdα)σ−1 (ϕλ∗ (ϕ))δ(σ−1) = σfp (2.22)













Product expertise cut-off for exporting. Similarly, export profits πji (ϕ, λi) increase
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with product expertise λi, such that there is a cut-off expertise level λ
∗
j (ϕ) for each man-
agement ability draw ϕ below which the firm will not export product i to country j. This











































Management ability cut-off for exporting. The export profits in country j of a firm




πji (ϕ, λ) z (λ) dλ− fhj. (2.26)
Since export profits πj (ϕ) increase with management ability ϕ, only firms with management































δ(σ−1) and πji (ϕ, λi) =
rji(ϕ,λi)
σ
















(ϕλ)δ(σ−1)−1 λ > 0 (2.28)







such that export profits in country j increase with management ability and only firms above
a zero-profit management cut-off will export to j.
Management ability cut-off for production. Firm ϕ’s global profits are given by















Since global profits π (ϕ) increase with management ability ϕ, firms with management below
a minimum level ϕ∗ will be unable to break even and exit immediately upon learning their
attributes. This cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition π (ϕ∗) = 0.

















Since rd (ϕ, λi) = Rd (Pdα)
σ−1 (ϕλi)
δ(σ−1) and πd (ϕ, λi) =
rd(ϕ,λi)
σ












σ−1 (ϕλ)δ(σ−1)−1 λ > 0 (2.31)









> 0, such that global profits increase with management ability and only
firms above a zero-profit management cut-off will commence production.
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2.4 Empirical Predictions
Proposition 1: Better managed firms are more likely to export.
Proof. This proposition follows from the result that total export profits πX (ϕ) =
∑
j πj (ϕ)
increase with management ability ϕ. On the intensive margin, we have already established
that bilateral export profits increase with management competence,
∂πj(ϕ)
∂ϕ
> 0. On the
extensive margin, only firms with ability ϕ ≥ ϕ∗j will sell to destination j. For destinations
j = {1, 2, ..., J}, denote
ϕ∗X = min {ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2, ..., ϕ∗J} (2.32)
Since firms with higher ϕ are more likely to have both ϕ ≥ ϕ∗j for any j and ϕ ≥ ϕ∗X
overall, they have a higher propensity to export to any given destination j, as well as a
higher propensity to be exporters, i.e. to export to at least one destination. The proof to
the next proposition is closely related and provides detailed derivations for these claims.
Proposition 2: Better managed firms export more products to more destina-
tion markets and earn higher export revenues and profits.














1, ϕ ≥ ϕ∗j
0, ϕ < ϕ∗j
(2.33)








Second, for any given market j, we have already shown that bilateral export revenues






> 0. From the product
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expertise cut-off condition for exporting, we know that
dλ∗j (ϕ)
dϕ
< 0. This implies that a






































, NX (ϕ) = 1−Z (λ∗X (ϕ))
(2.35)
where λ∗X (ϕ) = min {λ∗1 (ϕ) , λ∗2 (ϕ) , ..., λ∗J (ϕ)} denotes the minimum product expertise
cut-off for exporting λ∗j (ϕ) across countries j for a firm with given ϕ. Note that firms export


































































Proposition 3: Better managed firms offer higher-quality products if θ > 0,
but quality is invariant across firms if θ = 0. Better managed firms set lower
quality-adjusted prices if δ > 0, but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across
firms if δ = 0. Better managed firms charge higher prices if θ > δ and lower prices
if δ > θ, but prices are invariant across firms if θ = δ.
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Proof. This proposition can be established directly from the solution to the firm’s profit-
maximization problem above. Taking the partial derivative of firm’s price, quality and
quality-adjusted price with respect to management ability, we have:




























Recall that θ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0. It immediately follows that ∂qji
∂ϕ




< 0 if and only if δ > 0. Since the sign of
∂pji
∂ϕ






< 0 if δ > θ, and
∂pji
∂ϕ
= 0 if θ = δ.
Proposition 4: Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher
quality and/or more expensive assembly of higher complexity if θ > 0, but input
quality and assembly complexity are invariant across firms if θ = 0.
Proof. From Proposition 3, we know that better managed firms produce goods of higher
quality if and only if θ > 0. While we do not explicitly model firms’ endogenous choice of
product quality in the baseline framework, we assume that producing goods of higher quality
entails higher marginal production costs. The implicit micro-foundation for this quality
production function is that manufacturing higher-quality products requires more expensive




3.1 Extension 1: Endogenous Management
Our baseline model assumes that management competence is an exogenous draw at the
firm level. We now establish that Propositions 1-4 would continue to hold if an exogenous
firm primitive endogenously determines the firm’s choice of management practice, as long
as implementing more effective management practices improves firm performance but is suf-
ficiently more costly. Intuitively, adopting more sophisticated management practices can
enhance existing firm capabilities and thereby stimulate market entry and firm revenues.
Good management and intrinsic firm attributes may also be complementary, such that ef-
fective firm productivity may be supermodular in these two components. At the same time,
superior management strategies arguably require higher sunk costs of adoption (e.g. hiring a
manager, re-designing production facilities, training staff to use new data monitoring, etc.)
and higher fixed costs of production (e.g. collecting data, analyzing peformance, commu-
nicating results to staff, etc.). As a result of such economies of scale, exogenously better
firms that expect to be more competitive in the market and generate higher sales would
endogenously choose better management practices, thereby further improving their perfor-
mance. Propositions 1-4 would then hold both for the exogenous firm primitive and for the
endogenous management quality. In particular, the Propositions would state causal effects
for the firm primitive and conditional correlations for management, where the latter would
constitute one mechanism through which the former operates.
To illustrate this insight tractably and transparently, we make minimal functional form
assumptions for the impact of management choice on firm ability and for the cost of man-
agement adoption. The same insight would however apply more generally, as long as the
benefit to management upgrading increases faster with management competence than the
cost of management upgrading.
We assume that firm entrepreneurs receive an exogenous talent draw φ and choose to use
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management practice m at a convex fixed cost of fm, where dfm/dm > 0 and d
2fm/dm
2 > 0.
Firm ability ϕ = φm (φ) depends on the combination of talented entrepreneurs and manage-
ment effectiveness. Given product expertise draws λi, firms can produce one unit of product
i with quality qi = [ϕλi]
θ = [φm (φ)λi]
θ at a marginal cost of [ϕλi]
θ−δ = [φm (φ)λi]
θ−δ.
In this environment, the proof below establishes that Propositions 1-4 continue to hold as
conditional correlations for the endgenous management level in two steps: We first show
that Propositions 1-4 apply for effective firm ability ϕ = φm (φ). We then demonstrate that
effective firm ability and management are monotonically related, dϕ/dm > 0. Together,
these two results directly imply that Propositions 1-4 must also hold for management m (φ).
Proof. Step One
This extension of the model closely follows the solution concept in Sections 1.3 and 1.4
of this Appendix. Since the fixed cost of management adoption is independent of the firm’s
product scope, market penetration, and production scale, the firms’ profit maximization
problem can be solved in steps. The choice of management practice will be determined in
the last of these steps. All preceding steps will remain in essense the same as in the baseline
model, such that all key equations can be obtained simply by replacing ϕ with φm (φ).
First, note that entrepreneurial talent φ and management competence m always en-
ter multiplicatively as firm ability ϕ = φm (φ) and fix product quality at qi = [ϕλi]
θ =
[φm (φ)λi]
θ. The firm will therefore begin by choosing the profit-maximizing price and
quantity in each potential destination-product market, conditional on entry there. The op-
timal price, quantity, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product i in country j
will be given by equations (2.17). In particular, domestic profits πdi (φ,m, λ) from product i
and export profits πji (φ,m, λi) from product i in country j will be given by the expressions
below and increasing in management competence as before:























Second, the firm will decide which products to produce and which products to export to
destination j based on product expertise cut-offs for production and for exporting, λ∗ (φ,m)
and λ∗j (φ,m). As before, these cut-offs are given by zero-profit conditions and defined by
equations (2.23) and (2.25). However, these are no longer closed-form solutions that depend
only on the exogenous firm attribute ϕ and model parameters, since firm ability ϕ = φm (φ)
is now endogenous. Note also that these product expertise cut-offs are decreasing in both
















































Third, the firm will choose which export markets j to enter. This decision will be guided





= 0 as earlier.
Together, the results above imply that Propositions 1-4 hold for effective firm ability
ϕ = φm (φ).
Step Two
Given Step One above, Propositions 1-4 will atutomatically hold for management com-
petence m if effective firm ability ϕ = φm (φ) is increasing in m. We now prove this mono-
tonicity.
In the final stage of the firm’s problem, the entrepreneur will decide whether to begin
production upon learning his talent draw. It is at this point that the firm will also choose its
optimal management practice m and thereby effective ability ϕ, in order to maximize global
profits from domestic sales and any exports abroad. This profit maximization problem closely
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Note that by the definition of the zero-profit product expertise cut-offs λ∗ (φ,m) and





= 0 drop out. For ease of
notation, the exogenous terms characterizing aggregate expenditure, aggregate price indices,
and bilateral trade costs have been collected in Ad , 1σRd (Pdα)






Using this first order condition, one can solve for the firm’s optimal management com-




Adδ (σ − 1)
(φmλ)δ(σ−1)
m

















































We first show that the denominator ∂F/∂φ is positive. Note that
∂F
∂φ
= F1d (φ,m) +
∑
j
F1j (φ,m) , (3.11)
where for each country k in the set comprising the home economy d and all potential
export destinations j, k ∈ {d} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , J}, F1k (φ,m) is given by:
F1k (φ,m) = Akδ (σ − 1) (φm)δ(σ−1)−1
[
δ (σ − 1)
∫ ∞
λ∗k(φ,m)







Since ∂λ∗k (φ,m) /∂φ < 0 as shown above, it follows that ∂F/∂φ > 0.
We next examine the numerator ∂F/∂m:
∂F
∂m








where for each country k, F2k (φ,m) is given by:















Since ∂F/∂φ > 0 and d2fm/dm











Recalling that ∂λ∗k/∂φ = −λ∗k/φ and ∂λ∗k/∂m = −λ∗k/m for all k ∈ {d} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , J},















Akδ (σ − 1) (φm)δ(σ−1)−1
[
δ (σ − 1)
∫∞
λ∗k



















δ (σ − 1)
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(δ (σ − 1)− 1)
∫∞
λ∗k




δ (σ − 1)
∫∞
λ∗k






















We have thus proven that effective firm ability ϕ = φm (φ) is increasing in management
competence m. Since all comparative statics for ϕ hold as in the baseline model, it follows
that all propositions also hold as conditional correlations for management quality m even
when firms endogenously choose their management practices.
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3.2 Extension 2: Multiple Ability Components
The theoretical predictions of our baseline model would continue to hold if management
is one of multiple draws that jointly determine firm ability ϕ. For example, firm ability
ϕ = m ·φ may depend on the entrepreneur’s intrinsic talent φ and the manager’s competence
for implementing effective management practices m. If entrepreneurs and managers do not
match perfectly assortatively due to labor market frictions, then |corr(m,φ)| 6= 1. While all
firm outcomes would now be pinned down by ϕ instead of m alone, management competence
would have the same effects as in our baseline model ceteris paribus. Propositions 1-4 would
now hold for ϕ unconditionally, for φ conditional on m, and for m conditional on φ. The
last result is the conditional relationship that remains relevant for our empirical analysis.
3.3 Extension 3: Endogenous Quality
For expositional simplicity, we do not model firms’s choice of product quality in the base-
line model, and adopt instead a reduced-form quality production function. Endogenizing
firms’ choice of input and output quality in a richer framework would however preserve our
theoretical predictions. What is sufficient for this to occur is that output quality - and by
extension firm profits - is supermodular in firm ability and either the quality of inputs or the
complexity of the assembly process. We illustrate this point here by incorporating endoge-
nous quality choice as in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) into our baseline framework. The
same key insights would emerge with alternative microfoundations for the quality production
function.
We assume that there is complementarity between firm ability and input quality in the
production of output quality. In particular, using an input of quality cji, the firm can produce

















at a marginal cost of cji. In this setting, the parameter b can be interpreted as the scope for
quality differentiation, while the parameter ρ governs the degree of complementarity between
input quality cji and firm-specific management ϕ (as well as firm-product specific expertise
λi). The quadratic specification for cji is not crucial but adopted for tractability.
Given this quality production function, more capable firms will optimally use higher-
quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods.
Proof. Now the firm’s maximization problem becomes
max
pji,xji,cji
π (ϕ, λi) = pjixji − τ jxjicji − fpj







Substituting the constraint into the objective function, this is equivalent to solving
max
pji,cji













p−σji (pji − τ jcji)− fpj

















Substituting equation (3.19) into equation (3.20) and using equation (3.18) delivers the
following endogenous input quality cji and output quality qji as a function of firm manage-
ment ability ϕ and product expertise λi:
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cji = ci = (ϕλi)
b
2 , qji = qi = (ϕλi)
b . (3.21)
This expression immediately implies that better managed firms will endogenously choose





> 0. While we have allowed firms to freely vary input and output quality
across markets j, the quality production function we have considered guarantees that firms
optimally select a single quality level for each product i in their portfolio. Intuitively, better
managed firms would endogenously produce higher-quality goods for any given market under
alternative formulations that allow for quality customization across markets.
Finally, note that when θ = b and δ = b
2
, the solution in equation (3.21) corresponds
exactly to the reduced-form formulation of the quality production function in our baseline
model: Firms then produce one unit of product i with quality qi = (ϕλi)
θ at a marginal cost
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Appendix Figure 1A. US Management and Organizational Practices Survey: Examples
This figure provides examples of the 16 questions in the MOPS survey for the US that span the management
of physical capital resources (subdivided into monitoring production and setting targets) and of human capital
resources (incentives design).
Example 1: Monitoring: How is performance tracked?
Example 2: Targets: How are targets set?
Example 3: Incentives: How does promotion work?
Appendix Figure 1B. China World Management Survey: Examples
This figure provides examples of the 18 questions in the WMS survey for China that span
the management of physical capital resources (subdivided into monitoring production and
setting targets) and of human capital resources (incentives design).
This figure plots the WMS average management score across all firms in a country, averaged over all
WMS waves from 2004 to 2014. Each firm is scored on 18 questions and each question is marked on a
scale of 1 to 5, such that the overall firm and country scores have a range of 1 to 5.
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Lags: Trade Activity 2011 and Management 2010
Management 0.029*** 0.395*** 0.208*** 0.187*** 0.053*** -0.059*** -0.006 0.374*** 0.038*** -0.003 0.045** -0.048***
(9.48) (18.10) (16.19) (13.62) (3.25) (-4.19)   (-1.61)   (13.23) (3.86) (-0.81)   (2.21) (-2.62)   
R-squared 0.29 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.33 0.21 0.97 0.93 0.91
# observations 31,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Panel B. First Differences: Δ Trade Activity 2005→2010 and Δ Management 2005→2010
Management 0.004*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.025** 0.024** -0.024** 0.001 0.050*** -0.018*** -0.001 0.057*** 0.031***
(3.19) (4.12)   (4.28)   (2.53)   (2.25) (-2.49)   (0.41) (2.76) (-2.88)  (-0.53) (4.48) (3.69)
R-squared 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.042 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08
# observations 31,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Appendix Table 1. US Panel: Management and Trade Activity over Time
Export Performance Quality and Efficiency Imported Input Quality and Assembly Complexity
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, export and import activity in the panel for US firms with matched data in 2010. All
variables are defined in Tables 3-7. In Panel A, the dependent variable is for year 2011, while the management variable is for year 2010. In Panel B, both the
dependent and management variables are within-firm changes from 2005 to 2010. All regressions include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry,
noise controls, and a full set of 2010 firm controls as described in Table 2. Robust standard errors. Sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Management 0.546*** 0.387*** 0.361*** 0.431*** 0.340*** 0.111***
(6.98) (5.70) (5.43) (32.61) (27.01) (10.21)
Log Dom Sales 0.097*** 0.671***
(5.85) (64.28)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls N Y Y N Y Y
R-squared 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.71 0.75 0.85
# observations 2,520 2,438 2,438 13,000 13,000 13,000
Log Profits Log Profits
Appendix Table 2. (Export) Profits
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and profits.
The dependent variable is firms' log profits. All regressions for China include noise
controls and fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership
status. All regressions for the US include noise controls and fixed effects for firm state
and main NAICS-6 industry. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 also include a full set of firm controls
as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US
sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
China US
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Management 0.159** 0.152*** 0.200*** 0.062 0.226** 0.179*** 0.213*** 0.257*** 0.231*** 0.418***
(2.51) (3.06) (2.72) (0.75) (2.11) (17.44) (19.67) (19.76) (16.62) (20.8)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls N N N N N N N N N N
R-squared 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.32
# observations 2,236 2,236 2,236 2,236 2,236 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the extensive and intensive margins of their exports. All
variables, fixed effects, and noise controls are as described in Table 3, but the regressions exclude firm controls. Standard errors
clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Appendix Table 3. Extensive and Intensive Margins of Exports: No Firm Controls
State, NAICS-6 IndustryProvince, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year
USChina





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Management 0.475*** 0.058*** 0.250* 0.219*** 0.032 0.344*** 0.022*** 0.164*** 0.072*** 0.092***
(2.97) (3.32) (1.96)  (2.96) (0.37) (29.43) (6.92) (7.35) (5.54) (6.46)
Log Dom Sales -0.025*** -0.035 -0.007 -0.028 0.028*** 0.605*** 0.358*** 0.247***
(-7.33) (-1.46) (-0.43) (-1.50) (9.87) (33.62) (33.85) (21.83)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.98 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.27 0.45 0.43 0.35
# observations 1,935 3,123 1,935 1,935 1,935 13,000 32,000 13,000 13,000 13,000
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry
Appendix Table 4. Export vs. Domestic Activity
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, domestic and export activity. All regressions for China
include fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include fixed
effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as described in Table
3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
China US
Panel A. Sector-specific demand elasticity (Broda-Weinstein)

















CH - δCH θCH - δCH θUS - δUS θUS - δUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.332* -0.185 0.149** -0.203 0.042*** -0.046*** 0.003 0.034***
(1.96) (-1.48) (2.16) (-1.49) (2.99) (-3.68)   (0.68) (2.83)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.83
# observations 58,101 58,101 58,101 58,101 290,000 290,000 290,000 290,000
Panel B. Controlling for market power

















CH - δCH θCH - δCH θUS - δUS θUS - δUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.531* -0.385* 0.146** -0.200 0.040** -0.044*** -0.004 0.058***
(1.95) (-1.82) (2.16) (-1.49) (2.36) (-2.99)   (-1.01)   (4.69)
Market Share 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.038*  -0.040*  -0.002*  0.048*  
(0.94) (-1.01) (0.28) (1.43) (1.78) (-1.78)   (-1.72)   (1.78)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.84
# observations 58,101 58,101 58,101 58,101 290,000 290,000 290,000 290,000
This table examines the robustness of the relationship between firms' management practices and the price, quality,
quality-adjusted price and quantity of their exports. All variables, controls and fixed effects are as described in Table 5
with two exceptions. In Panel A, quality and quality-adjusted prices are constructed using industry-specific demand
elasticities from Broda-Weinstein (2006). In Panel B, an additional control is added for a firm's market power: its share
of total Chinese exports by destination-product-year (Columns 1-4) or of total US exports by destination-product
(Columns 5-8). Standard errors clustered by firm. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Appendix Table 5. Production Efficiency and Product Quality: Robustness
China US
Province, Dest-Product, Own, Year State, Dest-Product
China US
Province, Dest-Product, Own, Year State, Dest-Product
